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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 24, 1987, John Jackson, then Vice President of Great
Lakes United (GLU), received a letter from Canada's Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Joe Clark. The letter was in response to a series
of letters GLU had sent to Environment Canada and External Affairs
asking the Canadian government to include representatives of environ-
mental interest groups in the delegation to bilateral talks with the
United States over proposed revisions to the Canada-United'States
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.' Similar requests had been
made by Great Lakes United members in the United States to the
appropriate authorities there. Joe Clark's letter read, in part:
With respect to your request for observer status at the
bilateral review, you will appreciate that the presence of a
[binational] non-governmental group at the formal review of an
international agreement by its signatories raises some interest-
ing issues of propriety and precedent. Nonetheless, in view of
Great Lakes United's credentials as a serious and responsible
group, and our collective interest in ensuring the best possible
review of the Agreement, I am pleased to invite you and one
1. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., 30
U.S.T. 1383 [hereinafter 1978 GLWQA] (revising Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1972, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23 U.S.T. 301).
(Vol. 1
19931 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 3
other member of the Canadian section of Great Lakes United
to participate as observers to the Canadian delegation.2
This case history explores some of the issues of propriety and
precedent referred to by Secretary Clark. These issues not only have a
bearing upon Canadian-U.S. relations, but also reflect similar issues
raised elsewhere in international environmental relations. Non-govern-
mental organizations are increasingly insisting on the importance and
value of their participation.3 This inquiry into the participation of a
non-governmental organization (NGO)4 in bilateral Great Lakes
2. Letter from Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, to John
Jackson, Canadian Vice President, Great Lakes United (Sept. 24, 1987) [hereinafter
Joe Clark Letter] (on file with the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal).
3. See generally LYNTON Y. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 1990); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1989).
4. In the United Nation's system, where the term originates, "non-governmental
organization" designates any organization which has registered its interest in the
issues before the United Nations, has received accreditation from a United Nations
body, and is not part of a government body or legally constituted international
organization. Many of these organizations have as their primary mission the
promotion of internationalism and international institutions; others have played a
role in international development policy and in monitoring human rights agreements.
The class of specifically environmental NGOs is a rapidly growing newcomer to the
U.N. system. See NGOs at UNCED and its Parallel Events, E & D FILE 1992:
BRIEFINGS FOR NGOs ON UNCED (United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison
Service), July 1992 [hereinafter E & D FILE]. A formal procedure has been developed
to obtain credentials as an NGO through the United Nation's Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). The recent United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) accredited over 1,000 NGOs to its preparatory process and
the meetings in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. See Mathias Finger, NGOs in the UNCED
Process, in TRANSFORMATIVE NGOS AND WORLD POLITICS (Thomas Princen & Mathias
Finger eds., forthcoming 1992). UNCED facilitated NGO participation with a special
NGO-liaison office. In the nascent literature of international environmental affairs,
the term NGO is frequently used rather loosely to refer to any and all environmental
advocacy organizations operating in the realm of international politics. Such usage
may confuse matters by leading to conclusions about the role and influence of NGOs
when what is really being described is only one type of NGO, that composed of
environmental advocates and international conservation organizations. The
conclusions may or may not hold true for the variety of business organizations, such
as the International Chamber of Commerce, and service organizations, such as the
International YMCA, which are also accredited by the U.N. as NGOs. See E & D
FILE, supra. In the context herein, it may be preferable to drop the term NGO and
refer to the organizations individually by name. However, one of the purposes of this
article is to draw lessons from the case that may be applicable to the broader field
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negotiations creates an opportunity to empirically examine the
development of NGO strategies, cross-sectoral dynamics, internal
organizational development, and the relationships between institutions
and ecosystems. Observations and personal records of the participants,
as well as the historical record of joint Canadian-U.S. efforts to manage
and protect the Great Lakes, suggest conclusions which may be useful
for understanding other cases in which NGOs play a critical role in
international environmental relations.
Non-governmental organizations may be remapping the terrain of
international environmental affairs, but studies of international
environmental relations are still mostly presented from the perspective
of national governments and through the lens of academic study. This
study, by contrast, is a narrative and interpretive history of the role
played by NGOs in the events leading to the adoption of the 1987
Protocol to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement." We cannot
hope to understand Canadian-U.S. environmental relations without
considering the policies, strategies, and actions of the NGOs involved.
Furthermore, the NGOs themselves cannot be understood without
placing the evolution of their influence and their organizational
development within the context of binational relations and regional
politics. Most importantly, neither the NGOs nor states can be
understood apart from the geographic circumstances and the changing
ecological characteristics of the Great Lakes basin. Those geographic
realities ultimately shape the region's economies, demarcate its political
boundaries, and affect all enterprises within their realm.
of international environmental affairs. Most of the organizations involved on the
international stage are self-identified as NGOs. In this article, the term "NGO"
refers to a non-profit organization with bases or activities in more than one country,
which is unaffiliated with governments, which does not primarily promote the
objectives of governmental or corporate interests except when consistent with the
NGO mission, and which is involved in international environmental decision-making
forums where the recognized parties are nation-states. In particular, NGOs in the
Great Lakes region are the three organizations invited as observers to the 1987
negotiations to the GLWQA: The Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, and
Great Lakes United.
5. The growing significance ofNGOs in international environmental relations has
been generally recognized within the field of international relations. See, e.g.,
CALDWELL, supra note 3. However, much of the literature and historical accounts to
date on specific international environmental relations treat NGOs as secondary or
peripheral actors outside the international regime. The overall significance of NGOs
in international affairs is dealt with by Princen & Finger, supra note 4.
6. 1987 Protocol Amending the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978,
Nov. 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., Hein's No. KAV 255 [hereinafter 1987 Protocol].
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The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River comprise the world's most
extensive boundary waters and the world's largest system of fresh
surface water, draining nearly 200,000 square miles of land.! For
several centuries the Great Lakes region was a powder keg of tensions.
The French and British militaries, American and Canadian settlers, and
the North American indigenous nations all competed for navigational
access to the continent's interior and for control over its abundant fur-
bearing animals and other sources of wealth. By the twentieth century,
political power in the region was concentrated in the British
Commonwealth government of Canada and the government of the
United States.8 By the turn of the century, the two sovereigns had
begun to focus on cooperation, at first to recognize each other's rights to
peaceful navigation, then later to respond to what was becoming a
large-scale pollution catastrophe?
7. For an overview of the geographical and environmental characteristics of the
Great Lakes, see WILLIAM ASHWORTH, THE LATE, GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY (1986).
8. The relationships between the federal capitols and their respective states and
provinces differ significantly between the U.S. and Canada, particularly with regard
to natural resources and pollution control. Canadian provinces have greater control
over water resources than the state governments in the U.S. This has required
intergovernmental agreement between Canadian federal and provincial powers prior
to bilateral or international agreements which impact on provincial resources. For
example, the 1971 Canada-Ontario Agreement preceded the U.S.-Canada 1972 Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement. "The reality is that power under the constitution
is in federal hands in one nation [U.S.] and in provincial hands in the other
[Canada]." JOHN E. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND
A PROSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN-U.S. TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS 30
(1983) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY]. For a general overview of
constitutional and legislative differences regarding pollution control and the Great
Lakes, see id. at 29-38, 130-131. See also John E. Carroll, Differences in the Environ-
mental Regulatory Climate of Canada and the United States, 4 CAN. WATER
RESOURCES J. 16, 16-25 (1979). These differences have affected the development of
environmental NGOs in each country. Canadian groups have concentrated their
efforts at the provincial and regional levels, while U.S. organizations have
concentrated on influencing Washington. Great Lakes United and the Sierra Club
organize an annual Great Lakes Week in Washington but have not done the same
in Ottawa.
9. U.S.-Canadian bilateral cooperation regarding the Great Lakes was first
formalized by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which established navigational
rights, responsibilities, and institutional arrangements for the resolution of disputes
over boundary waters. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Boundary
Questions, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr.Brit. (for Can.), 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter
Boundary Waters Treaty]. Together, the Boundary Waters Treaty and The
International Joint Commission, a quasi-supranational binational commission
established by the Treaty, have evolved to provide a framework for bilateral
environmental cooperation between the U.S. and Canada regarding the Great Lakes.
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Since 1972, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) 10
has served as the reference point for cooperative action to reverse trends
of deteriorating water quality. The GLWQA is, according to the
International Joint Commission, a "milestone document, one of the first
international statements that technical, diplomatic, and administrative
approaches to resource management need to be considered in terms of
holistic ecological concepts."" These holistic ecological concepts are
manifested in the U.S.-Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
in four ways. First, acceptance of a common definition of the concept of
a Great Lakes Basin ecosystem, one which includes human beings and
adopts the concept of ecosystem integrity as the goal for environmental
restoration. Second, reliance on government intervention in the form of
ecosystem planning across jurisdictional boundaries. Third, the GLWQA
recognized that biological and ecological processes interact with physical
and chemical processes to bioconcentrate particular classes of persistent
toxic compounds, defined as "critical pollutants," requiring extraordinary
regulation. Finally, holistic ecological concepts were implemented by the
GLWQA through recognition that land use practices in one part of the
Great Lakes basin could significantly affect ecosystem quality in more
downstream, distant parts.
These concepts have evolved over the life of the Agreement. For
example, the scope of the 1972 GLWQA was largely determined by
national boundaries rather than by ecological parameters.'2 However,
the GLWQA is an example of an evolving governance structure,
reflecting a process of change through experimentation and response.
Research undertaken following the 1972 GLWQA established the basis
for the ecosystem approach which was embodied in the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1978.'3
An atmosphere of change in Great Lakes institutional arrangements
was encouraged by many forces, e.g., biophysical alterations of the
ecosystem; improvements in scientific understanding of ecology,
toxicology, limnology, and other relevant sciences; changing political
realities; and the evolution of concepts and laws concerning
Id. art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
10. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23
U.S.T. 301 [hereinafter 1972 GLWQAI.
11. International Joint Commission, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA AND THE STATE AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE
GREAT LAKES BASIN 13 (1984) [hereinafter IJC SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT].
12. 1972 GLWQA, supra note 10, art. I, 23 U.S.T. at 303.
13. 1978 GLWQA, supra note 1.
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governmental responsibility for the health of ecosystems and public
participation in decisions. These forces, both environmental and social,
are expressed through changes in the institutional structures of
governance. The process of change through experimentation and
response is sometimes referred to as "social learning." The evolving
Great Lakes governance structure is one example of complex
partnerships being experimented with throughout the world. 4
The Canada-U.S. 1978 GLWQA, with its espousal of an "ecosystem
approach" to environmental protection, has been promoted as a model
for global institutional arrangements."5 In fact, the Great Lakes
experience may be a model of sorts; lessons drawn from it may be
beneficially applied to other shared ecosystems and the biosphere as a
whole.
Issues concerning management of a shared ecosystem have at times
seemed to dominate Canadian-U.S. relations. The complex of organiza-
tions and individuals involved in Great Lakes water quality activities is
an evolving governance structure"' comprised of bilateral institutions;
14. Many of the world's largest lake basins and over 200 river basins cross
international boundaries. Notable international commissions for water resource
management include the International Commissions for the Protection of the Rhine,
Niger River Commission, Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the Mekong River
Basin. Naturally, each is differentiated by its political and ecological context. For
a comparative examination of the institutional arrangement in the Great Lakes and
other international basins, see Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in
International Water Law, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1985). See also Ludwik A.
Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Toxic Pollution and the Drainage Basin
Concept, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 27-50 (Albert Utton & Ludwik A.
Teclaff eds., 1987); CALDWELL, supra note 3, at 129-67.
15. The International Joint Commission Science Advisory Board, in its 1989
Report to the IJC, declared that "[the significance of the 1978 Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement lies in its strong affirmation of the need for an integrated
ecosystemic social-economic-environmental approach to problem solving." SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, 1989 REPORT 74 (1989)
[hereinafter SCIENCE ADVISORY REPORT]. The Board went on to suggest that
cooperative institutional arrangements which have evolved to implement the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement may serve as a model for international cooperation
on biospheric problems. Id. On a more regional level, institutional arrangements in
the Great Lakes have been widely noted as a model of basin-wide water resource
management. See generally CAPONERA, supra note 14.
16. This governance structure may be referred to as an international regime for
national resources, as used by Oran R. Young, who defines a regime as "social
institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable activities or sets of
activities. Like all social institutions, they are practices consisting of recognized roles
linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the
occupants of these roles." YOUNG, supra note 3, at 12.
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federal, state and provincial agencies; the "expert community"'1 of
professional and informal networks of scientists; environmental
advocates; native activists; financial, industrial, and tourism interests;
hunters and anglers; the press; and others. Within this governance
structure, private non-governmental organizations play a major role.
In examining the international relevance of the Canadian-U.S.
Great Lakes relationship, the growing influence of non-governmental
organizations in both domestic and binational Great Lakes policy-
making stands out. Environmental NGOs have played an important role,
particularly in the last decade, in defining the issues in both countries
and determining the bilateral institutional responses to those issues.
In 1989 the International Joint Commission wrote in its Fifth
Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality:
The emergence of strong, sophisticated and effective
non-governmental organizations over the past decade has been
a positive development. Composed of many thousands of Great
Lakes basin residents and others from both sides of the
international boundary, these organizations are important in
focusing political attention on the integration of Agreement
objectives into domestic priorities and programs. They are
instrumental in encouraging governments to provide the
resources necessary to implement the Agreement and actively
promoting environmentally conscious behavior among their
own membership and the public at large. As such, these
organizations fill a distinct niche in the Great Lakes institu-
tional framework .... 1s
17. "Expert community" means generally that informal system of professionals
with environmental expertise who serve governments, universities, non-governmental
organizations, and international agencies, and who share a common vocabulary and
international scientific culture. One commentator has termed this an "epistemic
community." PETER HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 52-63 (1990). For a thorough
treatment of the role of science and epistemic communities in resource management,
see generally INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND
POLITICS (Steinar Andresen & Willy Ostreng eds., 1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT].
18. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA AND THE STATE AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE
GREAT LAKES BASIN 4 (1989) [hereinafter IJC FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT].
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This study focuses on the formal bilateral review of the GLWQA
and the negotiations leading to the 1987 Protocol.19 Perhaps one of the
most significant aspects of the negotiations does not actually appear in
the document signed by the Parties: that is, the manner in which the
review and amendment negotiations were carried out. For the first time
in the long history of formal Great Lakes negotiations, representatives
of three non-governmental organizations-Great Lakes United, the
Sierra Club, and the National Wildlife Federation-were invited by the
U.S. State Department to participate as observers of the U.S. delegation.
Likewise, the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs invited two
representatives of Great Lakes United to serve as observers on the
Canadian delegation.
As we shall see, the Great Lakes United representatives and the
other observers did far more than observe. They were thoroughly
involved in discussing every aspect of the Agreement. They brought
with them a high degree of technical knowledge and an ability to
articulate technically-supported positions. The NGO observers had the
advantage of being part of a binational network of advocates. They were
thoroughly familiar with the proposals from both Parties, and the
internal politics of each, and therefore, they had a deep understanding
of the various proposals. In the end, the new Annexes added to the
GLWQA were significantly shaped in both wording and intent by the
persuasive efforts of the NGOs, despite their status as mere observers.
The efforts of the NGOs gave political expression to several
long-standing recommendations which had arisen from International
Joint Commission boards and other forums (such as the Anticipatory
Planning Workshop, the Pollution from Land-Use Activities Reference
Group (PLUARG), and the Hiram Workshop On Implementing the
Ecosystem Approach) held over the previous decade.2"
For example, the NGOs placed on the agenda, and won require-
ments for, public participation in GLWQA implementation, particularly
in the remedial plans required by Annex 2.21 They argued for and won
stricter and narrower definitions of "point source impact zones," as
defined in Article IV, insisting that no exceptions for industrialized
embayments be made to the Parties' commitment to the virtual
elimination of persistent toxic substances throughout the Great Lakes
ecosystem. NGO representatives also successfully supported a redefini-
19. See 1987 Protocol, supra note 6.
20. Interview with Michael J. Donahue, Executive Director, Great Lakes
Commission, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 21, 1991).
21. 1987 Protocol, supra note 6, Annex 2(eX2).
22. 1987 Protocol, supra note 6, art. IV.
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tion of critical pollutants and the elimination of gender-specific language
from the GLWQA. In addition to these changes, the range of subjects
covered under the amended Agreement's provisions was expanded,
partly as a result of the NGO efforts, to include airborne pollutants,
pollution from agricultural and land use activities, and contaminated
groundwater and wetlands protection. Perhaps most importantly, the
presence of the NGO delegation helped prevent political mischief in the
form of last minute alterations to the Protocol text.
There was one additional result of the 1987 Protocol which
apparently had not been anticipated fully by the Parties or the NGOs:
the weakening of the International Joint Commission (IJC) as an
international institution. The NGOs seem to have had little apprecia-
tion for the role the IJC and its "sub-Commissions" played as a force for
moral suasion. NGO consideration of the IJC during the process leading
to the 1987 Protocol was mostly limited to criticism of the Commission's
lack of implementation authority. The negotiators accepted the
recommendations of several observers that government accountability be
built into the GLWQA. As a result, the new Annexes clearly charge the
Parties with the responsibility for implementation and reporting on
progress. The ensuing agreement led to a new binational committee
structure which duplicated the existing set of IJC boards and commit-
tees. This new structure, coupled with NGO criticisms that government
members of the IJC boards were being compromised by conflicts of
interests, led the IJC Commissioners in 1991 to dissolve the committee
structure, effectively terminating an important intergovernmental
forum.'
What follows is a brief examination of the history of U.S.-Canadian
affairs pertaining to the Great Lakes, within the context of the
development of Great Lakes United, one of the three NGOs that was
granted observer status at the 1987 Protocol negotiations. This case
study concludes with the suggestion that this particular NGO experience
could well serve as a paradigm in the larger world of international
environmental negotiations.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENTS
A. Initial Setting
The negotiating history leading to the GLWQA dates back to the
late 19th century, when significant advances were made in waterworks
23. Telephone Interview with Kent Fuller, Senior Advisor, Environmental
Protection Agency, Great Lakes National Program Office (Sept. 28, 1991); Interview,
in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 21, 1991).
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engineering and economic development. Along with advances in
technology came plans for constructing major works with the potential
for altering parts of the Great Lakes hydrological system. Proposed
canals and dams raised concerns about water resource rights. Potential
and actual disputes over such rights recurred often and were handled
through a cumbersome series of diplomatic exchanges between the U.S.
State Department and Dominion authorities in the British Govern-
ment.24
Minor disputes festered due to the lengthy diplomatic correspon-
dence between London and Washington. A proposal for a Chicago
Drainage Canal to divert Lake Michigan water into the Mississippi
River Basin and another for a dam at the outlet of Lake Erie were two
of the most controversial. Both were initiated on the U.S. side with
little consideration given to the possible impact on Canadian rights and
resources.2
Dominion representatives pressed for a treaty that would protect
Canadian interests which they felt were constantly being pitted against
U.S. economic might. Canada sought a strong treaty enforced by a
commission with wide-ranging authority. The U.S., however, preferred
measures which would not impinge on national sovereignty rights. The
Boundary Waters Treaty of 190926 was the compromise result. It
established a body, the International Joint Commission (IJC), empow-
ered to act only upon those cases jointly referred to it by the Parties. It
held no authoritative powers over the two participating countries to
ensure compliance with its recommendations.'
Still, its structure did offer a unique approach to international
problem solving. The six Commissioners, three Canadian and three
24. At the turn of the century, bilateral disputes surrounded development of the
St. Lawrence Seaway for navigation, unilateral construction of the Chicago Diversion
Canal, the St. Mary River milk irrigation project and hydroelectric project, as well
as proposals for the St. Mary River at Sault Ste. Marie in Michigan and Ontario.
CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 40.
25. See generally N.F. Dreizinger, Dreams and Disappointments, in THE
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION: SEVENTY YEARS ON (Robert Spencer et al. eds.,
1988).
26. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9.
27. This institutional arrangement has had considerable influence on the limited
capacity of the International Joint Commission to implement the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreements and gain compliance on the terms of the Agreements. It has
been a recurring issue for the IJC and proponents of a more centralized supranation-
al authority. This limitation on authoritative power also differentiates the IJC, and
thus the Great Lakes ecosystem approach, from other international basins employing
a basin-wide management approach, such as Europe's Rhine River. See Caponera,
supra note 14, at 572-86.
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American, were expected to represent the Commission, not their home
countries. Decisions were to be made by consensus and, to insulate
commissioners from political pressure, no record was kept of the
decision-making process itself.' The failings of the IJC have not been
caused by disputes between the Parties, because almost every decision
has indeed been made by consensus. Rather, shortcomings have
resulted from the complex and difficult problems inherent in the Great
Lakes ecosystem itself. With the limited powers and resources the
Commission possesses, it has had to provide solutions and gain
cooperation from the Parties. The evolution of these issues and
institutional arrangements is central to understanding the significance
of the 1987 Protocol and the precedent set by environmental NGO
involvement.
B. Great Lakes Water Pollution: A Catalyst for Change
Interest in water pollution antedated the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty. At the time, typhoid fever was a major health problem in the
U.S. and Canada, and a clear link had been established between
polluted water and the spread of typhoid.' Investigative studies
conducted in the Great Lakes Region suggested the need for public
health legislation.' As a result, the Boundary Waters Treaty ad-
dressed water pollution in Article IV: "It is... agreed that the waters
herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the
boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other."31  This Article has grown in importance
immensely since 1909. It provided the basis for IJC investigations into
water pollution and water quality issues and eventually it provided the
rationale for the GLWQA."
The IJC received its first reference to investigate water pollution in
1913. Following investigative studies, both the U.S. and Canadian
28. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, art. X, 36 Stat. at 2453.
29. PHIL WELLER, FRESH WATER SEAS: SAVING -THE GREAT LAKES 59 (1990).
30. Id. at 60.
31. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450.
32. The International Joint Commission 1970 Reference Report, which provided
impetus for the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, cited pollution in the
lower Great Lakes which was in contravention of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY
OF CANADA, THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING
INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 20-23 (1985) [hereinafter NRC-RSC
Report].
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Commissioners issued preliminary reports that were dramatic in their
urgency. The language expressed deep concern: "[The] situation along
the frontier which is generally chaotic, everywhere perilous and in some
cases disgraceful... [and the conditions] imperil the health and welfare
of the citizens.., in substantial contravention of the spirit of the Treaty
"33
The Commission's 1918 reference report cited sewage from vessels,
cities, and industries as a major cause of the pollution problem. To
address the pollution problem, the Commission requested that it be
given sweeping powers to regulate and prohibit sewage pollution.'
The governments' response was a request to the Commission that it
draft a water quality treaty. By 1920, however, after widespread
acceptance of water filtration and chlorination had greatly reduced
typhoid fever, the urgency of eight years earlier had dissipated, and the
momentum for a water pollution treaty was lost.3' The spread of
typhoid fever had been a dramatic, high-profile water pollution crisis.
The adoption of widespread public health measures in cities around the
basin effectively removed water quality issues from the binational
agenda for the next two decades. However, the processes of ecosystem
degradation continued despite progress in protecting humans from
waterborne diseases.'
From the time of European settlement, human-induced stress on
the Great Lakes accelerated to the verge of ecosystem crisis. Logging
throughout the basin raised water temperatures and choked the
tributaries with the silt of eroded riverbanks. When streams were
dammed for mills, salmon lost access to spawning grounds and habitat.
Unrestrained fishing drove the populations of top predator species to
unsustainable levels. The Welland Canal provided access to the upper
lakes for sea lamprey from Lake Ontario. Seagoing vessels brought in
a myriad of other organisms. The cold water fishery was further
33. International Joint Commission, Final Report on the Pollution of Boundary
Waters Reference 31, 51 (1918), quoted in THE GREAT LAKES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA: A READER ON MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES 48 (Leonard B.
Dworsky & Charles F. Swezey eds., 1974) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT
STRATEGIES].
34. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF
BOUNDARY WATERS (1918).
35. See JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
HEALTH 202 (1990).
36. WELLER, supra note 29, at 61-66.
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devastated by oxygen depletion brought on by algal blooms stimulated
by sewage and other inadvertent forms of fertilizer.'7
By the time the general public took serious notice of the trauma to
the ecosystem in the 1960s, the momentum of large system modification
had already caused considerable damage. Scientific concern for the
health of the lakes and public demand for action prompted the govern-
ments of Canada and the U.S. to ask the IJC in 1964 for a study of
water pollution problems in the lower lakes: Erie, Ontario, and the St.
Lawrence. The study took six years to complete, but the IJC's conclu-
sions in 1970 recommended an international cleanup effort, and urged
the governments to develop programs to reduce phosphorus inputs and
to agree on controls and/or regulations for several pollution sources.
Those six years also saw a dramatic outpouring of public concern about
the environment.'
Negotiations leading to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
of 1972 began almost immediately after the governments received this
report. By that time, major fish die-offs, beach closings, mounds of
rotting seaweed, eutrophication from sewage and fertilizer pollution, and
river surfaces that actually caught fire, were evident. These visible
results served as the motivating backdrop for the GLWQA negotiations.
C. The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
In the 1972 GLWQA the Parties expressed their determination to
"restore and enhance water quality in the Great Lakes System."'39 The
Agreement also gave the IJC additional responsibilities for collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating information on the operations and
effectiveness of government programs to improve the water quality of
the Great Lakes. Also, it tendered advice and recommendations to
federal, state, or provincial governments for dealing with water quality
problems, and assisted in the coordination of joint efforts to control
pollution, including the discharge of phosphorus into the lakes.4 9
These new powers, in effect, constituted a permanent reference.
The Commission was no longer required to wait for the Parties to refer
specific questions to it before commenting, criticizing, and offering
advice. In order to carry out its new functions under the GLWQA, two
37. SEA GRANT INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1984-86 BIENNIAL REPORT
1-11 (1986).
38. For documented examples of the growth of public concern, see WELLER, supra
note 29, at 89-93. See also ASHWORTH, supra note 7, at 123-48.
39. 1972 GLWQA, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. at 302.
40. Id. arts. V, VI, 23 U.S.T. at 305, 308.
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new binational IJC boards were established: the Water Quality Board
and the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board. The Water Quality Board
serves as the principal advisor to the IJC on all matters pertaining to
the GLWQA.4' The Science Advisory Board serves the broader, less
focused purpose of advising the Commissioners on research and scientific
matters and calling attention to new and emerging issues.42
The new boards made available to the Commission a source of
technical and managerial expertise, allowing the commissioners to
broadly comment on the biennial reports they issued under the GLWQA.
Research and reports completed by the boards did more than inform the
Commission. Their work clarified and documented the causes of water
pollution, and recommended government action. The boards also
stimulated and became part of a new web of working relationships
among U.S. and Canadian natural scientists, ecologists, bureaucrats,
and policy scholars with links to both governments and the new
environmental NGOs of the 1970s.43 The seeds of this new "expert
community" were sown in earlier collaborative efforts. Such efforts
include the Northington study of Lake Erie begun in 1960, work done
under the 1964 U.S. Water Resources Research Act, preparation for the
1972 International Field Year on the Great Lakes, and the
Canada-United States University Seminar (CUSIS)."
41. The Water Quality Board is composed of nine American and nine Canadian
managers of pollution control programs appointed by the Commissioners on
recommendation from the government agencies. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION, 70 YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT: REPORT FOR THE YEARS 1978-1979 21-
22 (1980).
42. A new addition to the structure of the International Joint Commission has
been the Council of Great Lakes Research Managers, originally set up to serve the
Science Advisory Board as a direct connection to those responsible for prioritizing and
funding research on Great Lakes problems. In the most recent reorganization of the
IJC committee structure, the Council was raised in status to equivalency with the
Water Quality Board and the Science Advisory Board, and now reports to the
Commission.
43. A joint Canadian-U.S. group of research managers recently reported on the
Great Lakes research community's contributions, research priorities, and future
challenges. See COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES RESEARCH MANAGERS, FUTURES
WORKSHOP (1989) [hereinafter FUTURES WORKSHOP]. For an in-depth treatment of
the role of science in the formation and transformation of international regimes or
governance structures, see INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 17.
44. The first session of CUSIS, involving faculty members of twenty Canadian
and U.S. colleges and universities, was held from December 1971 to June 1972 and
focused on strengthening institutional arrangements for international resource
management in the Great Lakes. See MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES,
supra note 33, at 7. See also Leonard B. Dworsky, The Great Lakes: 1955-1985, in
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The Agreement's remedial strategies grew principally out of the
recommendations of the two reference groups instituted in 1964 to study
the lower Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River areas, where the
pollution was most conspicuous. To expand on the previously completed
studies, the GLWQA called for two major follow-up studies: one on the
upper lakes and the other on the diffuse sources known as non-point
source pollution. Further, two IJC study groups were formed: the
Upper Lakes Reference Group and the Pollution from Land-Use
Activities Reference Group (PLUARG). The Upper Lakes Reference
Group played a key role in the evolution of public participation in IJC
reference studies.45 This group contracted with Great Lakes Tomorrow
to hold a series of public workshops explaining the issues and soliciting
opinions. This experience provided the basis for future citizen-
involvement in IJC activities.4 6
The advances the Upper Lakes Reference Group made in public
participation were taken to new levels in the massive ecological study
known as the Pollution from Land-Use Activities Reference (PLUARG).
This five-year study of pollution from agriculture, forestry, and other
land uses included over one hundred investigators. This was the first
IJC reference dealing with the entire Great Lakes basin and involving
public consultation panels from throughout the basin." It proved to be
very important not only in expanding scientific understanding of
multiple sources of pollution, but also in laying the groundwork for an
ecosystemic approach and expanding public participation in IJC
activities.
Although there was little precedent for involving non-government-
appointed experts in IJC investigations, the logic of public participation
in PLUARG was relatively simple. The reference group was being asked
to study an impossibly large subject across a vast geographic area-the
set of activities within the Great Lakes drainage basin, including
PERSPECTIVES ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES: A READER 59
(Lynton K. Caldwell ed., 1988) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES].
45. It is useful to note that the Boundary Waters Treaty contained a mandate for
public hearings in conjunction with applications for approval for engineering works.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, art. XII, 36 Stat. at 2453-54. The IJC had
also traditionally held hearings prior to the issuance of their recommendations to the
governments. These were part of a formal process and the public tended to be
intimidated, particularly in light of the increasingly technical nature of the reports.
Interview with Mimi Becker, past President, Great Lakes Tomorrow, in Ann Arbor,
Mich. (Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Becker Interview].
46. Becker Interview, supra note 45.
47. Robert J. Mason, Public Concerns and PLUARG: Selected Findings and
Discussion, 6 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 210-22 (1980).
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agriculture, suburban development, and highway construction. Such
activity either added polluting substances to the ground, ultimately to
reach the lakes, or increased erosion and subsequently the run-off of silt
and soil into the lakes. If such activities were to be controlled, they
would ultimately be controlled at the local, and even the individual,
level. In order for PLUARG to derive recommendations based on the
actual pattern of life activities in the Great Lakes basin, and in order for
those recommendations to have any chance of successful
implementation, the cooperation and support of large numbers of
politically influential individuals would be required. Public participation
in PLUARG was premised on a general trend toward democratization of
the decision-making processes usually left to experts,48 on the opinion
of those same experts that the public had valuable insights and self-
acquired information to share. In addition, the public would need to be
mobilized before PLUARG could achieve its ends. The stated objectives
of the PLUARG consultation panels were to gain public support for the
final PLUARG report to the IJC and to lend credibility to both PLUARG
and the IJC.49
The reference group organized seventeen citizen panels around the
basin, nine in the U.S. and eight in Canada, totalling several hundred
citizens.' The consultation process was unique, characterized by its
geographic extent, binational involvement, and use of citizen panels.51
Citizens advised PLUARG on all aspects of the study. Their
involvement not only had a direct impact on the final report but also
positively influenced people's attitudes toward the GLWQA. It was
successful in gaining both support and credibility, as was hoped. 2 A
state-federal water resource planning agency reported that "public
involvement in PLUARG had been a useful and successful aspect of the
study, indicating that public involvement should continue to be a part
48. A.P. Grima & Robert J. Mason, Apples and Oranges: Toward a Critique of
Public Participation in Great Lakes Decisions, CAN. WATER RESOURCES J., Jan. 1983,
at 22 [hereinafter Apples & Oranges].
49. Id. at 40.
50. Grima and Mason observe that a "very limited' public was involved in the
PLUARG consultation panels, and the "general public remained generally unaware
of the PLUARG study." Id. However, they further note that "the panels were
representative of most potentially affected interests." Id.
51. Mason, supra note 47, at 210.
52. See Apples & Oranges, supra note 48; Carol Y. Swineheart, A Review of
Public Participation in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, in GREAT LAKES:
LIVING WITH NORTH AMERICA'S INLAND WATERS (David H. Hickox ed., 1988).
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of future management strategy.'' s Although PLUARG panel-reports
and the final report to the IJC recommended expanded public education
and participation, no provisions were made by the IJC or the Parties for
the continued involvement of consultation panel representatives in
implementation of PLUARG's recommendations.' Despite this, Mimi
Becker, who ran public workshops to train interested citizens for
participation in IJC hearings, maintains that along with the work on the
Upper Lakes Reference Group, the PLUARG efforts "set the precedent
for opening up the IJC annual meetings so that citizens could have more
than just the privilege of asking questions during the press conference,
and provided the basis for the IJC to deal more substantively with
informed members of the public."'
In addition to opening up the process to the public in unprecedented
ways, the research accomplished under these new investigative
initiatives furthered the ecological understanding of the Great Lakes
and provided a scientific base of information which served as the
impetus for the 1978 GLWQA. Studies confirmed the impacts of
cross-media pollution such as acid rain and non-point source pollution
from agricultural lands and groundwater sources, thus substantiating
the need to consider more than just water quality in efforts to curb
pollution. 5
The 1972 GLWQA was in force for five years before it was revisited
by the Parties. In the years between 1972 and 1978, progress was made
in reducing phosphorus inputs through sewage treatment and the
gradual elimination of phosphorus from laundry detergents. The
eutrophication problem was on its way to being resolved. With this
success, the problem of toxic industrial chemicals and pesticides present
in the flesh of fish and other animals-previously masked by the more
visible problems of eutrophication-once again emerged as the focus of
concern in the Great Lakes. 7
53. GREAT LAKES COMMUNICATOR (U.S. Great Lakes Basin Commission, Ann
Arbor, Mich.), Oct. 1978, at 7.
54. See Swineheart, supra note 52, at 121.
55. Becker Interview, supra note 45.
56. "PLUARG's more than 100 reports [during its six year study] were crucial in
putting the ecosystem approach at the core of the 1978 (Great Lakes Water Quality]
[Aigreement." THEODORA E. CoLBORN ET AL., GREAT LAKES, GREAT LEGACY? 195
(1990). Caldwell also notes the significance of PLUARG in incorporating the
ecosystem approach in the 1978 GLWQA. See R.L. Thomas et al., The Ecosystem
Approach:A Strategy for the Management of Renewable Resources in the Great Lakes
Basin, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 31-57.
57. See generally COLBORN, supra note 56; ASHWORTH, supra note 7; WELLER,
supra note 29.
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As early as 1963, studies of herring gull eggs in Lake Michigan
concluded that thinning shells and poor reproductive success were
probably associated with concentrations of dichlorodiphenyltrichloro-
ethane (DDT) and its toxic metabolite, dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethylene
(DDE), which birds assimilated from their diets of Lake Michigan fish.
In 1968, mercury from the chlor-alkali wastes, dumped into the lakes
and their tributaries, was measured in the sediment and fish of Lake
Ontario. In 1971, common terns with deformed cross-bills were
discovered in Hamilton Harbor in Ontario, an apparent result of the
chemical stew of polychlorinated biphenyls, DDT, and hexachlorobenzene
found in their eggs. Mirex, an organic chemical fire retardant and
pesticide, was discovered in fish in the early 1970s.' By the mid-
1970s, states and provinces were routinely issuing warnings about
eating the fish from the lakes, and several commercial fisheries were
closed.59  The chemicals of primary concern are synthetic organic
chemicals produced directly by, or as byproducts of, industrial processes.
Sources range from industrial and municipal outfalls, contaminated air
and rain, leaking landfills, previously contaminated sediment
resuspended by currents, dredging and storms, agricultural practices,
and the widespread household use of solvents and pesticides. Together,
these chemicals represent a source of biochemical stress new to the
industrial era which Great Lakes creatures have never previously
encountered and for which few, if any, species have evolved coping
mechanisms. The most serious threat comes from chemicals which do
not break down through metabolic action and those which are insoluble
in water and concentrate in fat. This resulting environmental
persistence means these chemicals circulate and recirculate unchanged
through the ecosystem's physical and biological pathways, gradually
becoming ubiquitous throughout the system. Because these chemicals
are stored in fatty tissues, and have a tendency to accumulate, the
concentration levels increase as the chemicals make their way up the
food chain. For example, PCBs are bioaccumulated 25-million-fold in
Great Lakes food webs, from water to bald eagles' eggs. Hence, minute
58. WELLER, supra note 29, at 113.
59. For more detailed accounts of scientific findings regarding the effect of toxics
on Great Lakes biota, see Michael Gilbertson, Epidemics in Birds and Mammals
Caused by Chemicals in the Great Lakes, in ToxIc CONTAMINANTS AND ECOSYSTEM
HEALTH: A GREAT LAKES Focus (M. Evans ed., 1988). See also COLBORN, supra note
56, at 113-85 (examining the ecological and human health impacts of toxics in the
Great Lakes).
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amounts of certain chemicals can become large problems throughout the
whole system.'
The toxics problem was significantly more complicated than the
primary nutrient pollution problem addressed by the 1972 GLWQA
which could be traced with comparative ease to municipal sewage
systems and phosphorus in detergents. Two solutions to nutrient
pollution, installation of sewage treatment plants and prohibition of
phosphorus detergents, although expensive, were manageable with the
participation and coordination of existing state and provincial
governments. By contrast, the problem of toxic contamination
emphasized in the 1978 GLWQA could not be solved by a single
jurisdiction or without substantial changes in industry and consumer
practices. The 1987 Protocol needed to break new ground in
international cooperation and institutional arrangements.
The lesson taught by the presence of toxics in the Great Lakes was
that society ignores the interrelationships of the natural system at its
own peril. By the time levels of pollution reach the point where damage
is apparent, governments face dwindling choices for correcting the
problem. Clean-up costs are exorbitant and restoration may be
impossible. The only pollution policy that makes sense is prevention,
i.e., understanding how stresses are likely to alter the ecosystem and
eliminating those stresses that are preventable while minimizing those
that are not. From such realizations came the case for a policy based on
ecosystem science and a subsequent commitment by Canada and the
U.S. in the GLWQA to an ecosystem-based approach to restore the
integrity of the Great Lakes.
Indeed, the 1978 GLWQA's61 purview was greatly expanded. After
recognizing that the problems of toxics in the Great Lakes could not be
resolved by actions focused on the lakes alone, the 1978 Agreement
extended the scope of the 1972 GLWQA to the entire Great Lakes
ecosystem, including the land surrounding the lakes and the inflowing
streams.62 In addition to extending the physical boundaries covered by
the treaty, the concept of water quality was expanded, and the interde-
pendence of all components of the ecosystem, including humans, was
60. For an overview of bioaccumulation of toxics and related impacts on Great
Lakes species, see R.J. ALLAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENT CANADA, Toxic CHEMICALS IN
THE GREAT LAKES AND ASSOCIATED EFFECTS (1991).
61. 1978 GLWQA, supra note 1.
62. Id. arts. I(g),(h), 30 U.S.T at 1385.
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acknowledged.' The 1978 GLWQA defined the Great Lakes ecosystem
as "the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms,
including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence
River."
The 1978 Agreement also expressed several additional concerns in
response to the findings of IPLUARG regarding non-point source
pollution and the effects of air pollution on water quality. The U.S. and
Canadian governments agreed that "[t]he discharge of toxic substances
in toxic amounts be prohibited and the discharge of any or all persistent
toxic substances be virtually eliminated," and "to eliminate or reduce
to the maximum extent practicable the discharge of pollutants into the
Great Lakes System."'
The foregoing two aspects of the GLWQA-"the ecosystem approach
to environmental protection and zero discharge of persistent toxics-
derived from the growing awareness of ecology and the nature of the
toxics problems.67 The adoption of these concepts within a binational
agreement is of major international importance. The challenge facing
the governments in the region is how to translate an ecosystem
approach and zero discharge into action feasible within the constraints
presented by each nation's federal structures and political cultures.6
63. The 1978 GLWQA includes Lake Michigan, which was not previously
considered part of the 'boundary waters" because it was geographically situated
wholly within U.S. jurisdiction. Its inclusion in the 1978 GLWQA is one example of
the increasing predominance of an ecosystem perspective and consideration of
ecological factors. See id. Commenting on further shifts in this direction, the Council
of Great Lakes Research Managers summarized the two-decade transition in the
context of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements: 'The transition of the
Agreement from an Agreement on water quality (in 1972) to an Agreement on water
quality in an ecosystem context (1978), to an Agreement on managing the human
uses and abuses of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem, is not completed, but the 1987
[P]rotocol represents significant movement in this direction." FUTURES WORKSHOP,
supra note 43, at 121.
64. 1978 GLWQA, supra note 1, art. I(g), 30 U.S.T. at 1385.
65. Id. art. II(a), 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
66. Id. art. II, 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
67. For a treatment of these concepts from an advocacy perspective, see
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION AND THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY, A PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY GREAT LAKES: A REPORT OF THE
PROGRAM FOR ZERO DISCHARGE (1991).
68. The problems and contradictions inherent in translating "an ecosystem
approach" into meaningful action have been fairly well explored though not yet
resolved. See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 45; see also Don Munton, Toward a More
Accountable Process: The Royal Society.National Research Council, in PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 45, at 299 (examining the limitations ofinstitutional arrangements); W.J.
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As the International Joint Commission wrote:
Existing resource management approaches which partition the
environment into separate components of land, water and air
with associated biota are recognized as inadequate since
management of a resource component in isolation from
adjacent or interacting components would likely produce short-
sighted strategies to protect one component of the environment
at the expense of another. Because existing environmental and
resource programs are separated, compartmentalized and
spread throughout various bureaus, agencies, ministries and
departments, the new approach requiring a holistic overview
entails, at the very least, a reorganization of thinking, and
perhaps a reorganization of institutional arrangements.69
It may be that fundamental institutional change is necessary before
an ecosystem approach to environmental protection can become a reality,
however, institutional arrangements seldom reorganize without pressure
from outside forces. The participation of environmental NGOs in the
decision-making process (insofar as it encourages governments to be
accountable for their ecosystem commitments) and the introduction of
new and creative ideas into the institutional dialogue may be instrumen-
tal in closing the gap between ecosystem rhetoric and action. Of all the
problems, the ubiquitous presence of industrial chemicals and pesticides
that taint the lakes and compromise the health of its living creatures
has most taxed the creativity and resources of government
environmental agencies. The seeming intractability of the toxics
problem has brought into question the effectiveness of accepted
regulatory policy and structures. As a result, the opportunity to
challenge government's willingness and its ability to protect the
environmenthas been created. Several non-governmental organizations
have stepped forward, presenting alternative approaches to
environmental protection. They have pushed their agendas at the local,
state and provincial, national and international levels. Claiming a stake
in the entire ecosystem regardless of borders, they have acquired
legitimacy as defenders of environmental interests. These NGOs have
gained leverage with the Parties and other actors by communicating and
Christie et al., Managing the Great Lakes as a Home, 12 J. GREAT LAKES REs. 2
(1986). Cf Barry B. Boyer, Ecosystem, Legal System, and The Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, 41 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 1993) (offering a more
legalistic analysis); Jack Manno, Federalist and Ecologist (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
69. IJC SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 13.
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strategizing across national boundaries, and by using the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, especially its espousal of the ecosystem
approach and zero discharge, as their own. As the National Wildlife
Federation's Tim Eder has said, "[I]t's always important to have goals
against which to measure governments' progress, all the better if it's
something the governments themselves have put out there."7° The
environmental NGOs in the Great Lakes region have often played this
role vis-a-vis the GLWQA, pushing the institutions to find ways of
implementing the various programs outlined in the Agreement. 1
The three NGOs invited as observers to the 1987 Protocol negotia-
tions-the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), and
Great Lakes United (GLU)-had each pressured governments in their
own ways to implement the GLWQA. The Sierra Club, although
originally a California association focused on the Sierra Nevada
Mountains, has grown into a nationwide organization since the end of
World War II, with a current membership of nearly half a million. The
Sierra Club's expanded purpose, according to its public literature, is:
[T]o explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to
practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's
ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to
protect and restore the quality of the natural and human
environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these
objectives.72
In 1986, the Club increased its level of political activity in the Great
Lakes by initiating the Great Lakes Federal Policy Project with funding
from the George Gund and Joyce Foundations. Along with Great Lakes
United, the Project coordinates an annual Great Lakes Washington
Week which brings activists to Washington to meet with congressional
representatives and EPA officials. The activists gain hands-on experi-
ence with federal environmental policy making, and raise Great Lakes
70. Interview with Tim Eder, Staff Member, National Wildlife Federation, in
Traverse City, Mich. (Sept. 28, 1991); Telephone Interview (Mar. 28, 1991).
71. Oran R. Young has observed that "[i]nternational regimes... commonly give
rise to nongovernmental interest groups committed to defending the provisions of
specific regimes and prepared to press governments to comply with their dictates.
In fact, the establishment of a regime can stimulate the growth of powerful interest
groups in a number of the member states, which then form transnational alliances
in order to persuade responsible agencies to comply with the requirements of the
regime." Id. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 78. Young cites the Mediterranean Action
Plan and the 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements as examples.
72. The Sierra Club (informational brochure, on file with author).
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issues at meetings and hearings. The Project also publishes a monthly
report, the goal of which is to "provide timely information on federal
actions affecting environmental quality of the Great Lakes,... [and to]
report on the activities of Congress, key agencies and other negotiations,
covering issues from pollution control to appropriations." 3
The Great Lakes Federal Policy Project has offices in Washington,
but is closely coordinated with the Sierra Club's Midwest Regional office
and is led by the region's director, Jane Elder. Elder, along with GLU's
Tim Eder, and the National Wildlife Federation's Mark Van Putten,
formed the NGO observer group on the U.S. delegation to the 1987
Protocol negotiations.
The National Wildlife Federation was founded in 1936 "to educate
the public about conservation as well as the symptoms of and the
solutions to environmental abuse and neglect. ,7 4 The Great Lakes
Regional Office (GLRO) in Ann Arbor, Michigan, has focused on the
effects of toxic chemicals on fish and wildlife. The GLRO has also
focused on political and legal pressure to reduce the input of toxics to
the lakes.
Great Lakes United, a transnational coalition of organizations,
including Sierra Club locals and National Wildlife Federation affiliates,
was the NGO most involved in monitoring the GLWQA. Therefore, the
evolution of GLU's organizational structure, positions, and strategies,
warrants examination. GLU's history and its participation in the review
process for the 1987 Protocol is highlighted because, "as a coalition of
sportsmen, environmental, conservation, labor, business, community
organizations, and individuals from eight Great Lakes states and two
Canadian provinces,"'" it represents a diversity of interests in both
nations. Member organizations have their own contradictory interests
but agreed to suspend those conflicts to cooperate for the benefit of the
ecosystem. GLU encourages personal identification as "citizens" of a
watershed. Identification with ecozones, or bioregions, challenges
presumptions of the predominant importance of national interests,
presumptions which are, as shall be seen, already undermined by the
nature of the environmental issues under discussion. As noted above,
Great Lakes United includes groups with a broad spectrum of interests.
It has had to carefully nurture the shared assumption of mutual
interests in the coalition, while speaking with a clear and consistent
voice on behalf of environmental protection.
73. GREAT LAKES WASH. REP. (The Sierra Club), Mar. 1987, at 1.
74. National Wildlife Federation (informational brochure, on file with author).
75. Great Lakes United (informational brochure, on file with author).
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As a binational organization, GLU has credibility when dealing with
binational issues, and thus has played a greater role in the
Canadian-U.S. dialogue than advocacy groups operating in either nation
exclusively. -Several commentators and scholars have remarked on
GLU's effectiveness." As will be seen, GLU was particularly effective
in developing and implementing a strategy for influencing the way the
governments carried out their responsibility for reviewing the GLWQA
in 1987.
III. GREAT LAKES UNITED: BUILDING PUBLIC CONSENSUS AND
POLITICAL WILL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY AGREEMENTS
A. Background
1. Institutions. Not surprisingly, the issues which have engaged
concerned citizens in the Great Lakes region have changed along with
the chemical, ecological, and social transformations described above.
Early in the century, public health reformers in cities across the region
led the push for drinking water treatment and sanitation.77 The
preservationist movement that gave rise to the Sierra Club and other
groups in the United States78 had an impact on the Great Lakes region,
most notably in the effort to protect the Indiana Dunes from industrial
developments concentrating on the southern shore of Lake Michigan.79
The environmental movement in Canada has evolved from slightly
different origins and influences, although sharing similar goals of
preservation and conservation. In the 1960s, small environmental
organizations arose throughout the region. Most of these focused on
specific evidence of pollution problems in their immediate area:
examples include fouled beaches in Erie, Pennsylvania, concerns about
drinking water safety in Toronto, alewife die-offs in Lake Michigan, the
76. Weller has quoted Governor James Blanchard as describing GLU as
"informed, effective and influential." WELLER, supra note 29, at 121. The Institute
for Research and Public Policy and the Conservation Foundation together noted
GLU's prominent role in binational cooperation. COLBORN, supra note 56, at 217. See
also SALLY LERNER, A STUDY OF ONTARIO VOLUNTEER ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP
GROUPS (Heritage Resources Centre Technical Paper No. 6, 1991).
77. See generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES: A HISTORY
OF THE URBAN WATER SUPPLY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 248-64 (1956).
78. Seegenerally ECOLOGY VERSUS POLITICS IN CANADA(William Leiss ed., 1979).
79. See J. RONALD ENGEL, SACRED DUNES: THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY IN
THE INDIANA DUNES 271 (1983).
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decline of lake trout fishing in Irondequoit Bay, and efforts to protect St.
Lawrence riverbanks and islands from the effects of Seaway
activities.8°
In many of these situations the public concern over the visible
effects of pollution on their environment outpaced their knowledge of the
causes. Governments were unable to respond to citizens' concerns with
definitive answers."' This gap stirred many to turn to the new
environmental organizations which placed blame squarely upon industry
practices and government neglect. Heightened awareness of the
environmental problems in the late 1970s, as well as growing environ-
mental activism, resulted in a proliferation of new organizations in the
Great Lakes basin and throughout the U.S. and Canada. 2
Concerns, particularly in the Lake Ontario region, reached new
heights with the dramatic news surrounding the Love Canal contamina-
tion crisis. Organizations like Pollution Probe in Toronto pointed out
that the same chemicals driving Love Canal residents from their homes
were leaking from scores of waste sites along the Niagara River, only 50
kilometers from Toronto's drinking water intake pipes directly across the
western basin.'
Not only were environmental organizations in both Canada and the
U.S. becoming increasingly involved in Great Lakes issues, they were
also occasionally collaborating with each other across the border.
Pollution Probe and Operation Clean Niagara, from Niagara-on-the-
Lake, Ontario, received amicus curiae standing in lawsuits involving the
dioxin-contaminated Hyde Park landfill in New York where leachate was
trickling down the walls of the Niagara gorge into the river."
Pollution Probe also worked closely with a local coalition that had been
heavily involved in Love Canal issues, the Ecumenical Task Force of the
Niagara Frontier.
The exchanges between Canadian and American activists provided
lessons for both, as they each saw aspects in.the other's legal institu-
80. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 130.
81. Steven Schatzow, The Influence of the Public on Federal Environmental
Decision-Making in Canada, in PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING 141,148-49 (W.R.
Sewell & J.T. Coppock eds., 1977).
82. For an informative overview of the origins and development of North
American environmental movements, particularly with regard to the issue of toxic
pollution, see ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 13-40 (1989).
83. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 145-48.
84. See United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. 1067
(W.D.N.Y.), aff/d, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984). See also WELLER, supra note 29, at
146-47.
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tions and administrative cultures' that they coveted. Canadian public
servants, in general, had more discretionary authority to take action.
As a result, when Canadian environmentalists participated in public
consultation procedures, they were more confident that they were
speaking with individuals who could make decisions. A tradition of
public consultation has existed in Canada and agencies often provide
travel and other support to private groups to facilitate participation. As
a result of this very independence, however, Canadian administrative
decisions are less open to legal challenges in the courts, and Canadian
activists, therefore, often look longingly across the border to a public
armed with what looks (from the Canadian perspective) more like real
power in the form of access to environmental litigation.86
Along with these different traditions of public participation,
Canadian and American groups also differ in their level of political
independence as a result of different tax laws. The Canadian tax system
makes it much more difficult for organizations with any political content
to obtain tax exempt status." As a result, Canadian groups have less
access to private and foundation funding and often rely on the govern-
ment for the bulk of their income. To Americans, this government
support has often appeared to represent a more generous form of
democracy in that Canadians are, in some respects, being paid to
challenge their governments.
2. Issues. Two issues surfaced in the late 1970s which fostered a
sense of shared interest among environmentalists, government officials,
and many businesses around the basin in both countries: proposals to
divert Great Lakes water to the drought-stricken Midwest region of the
continent, and reconsideration of winter navigation on the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway. In addition, many of the traditional
sportsman and conservationist organizations began paying increased
attention to threats to fish and game and their habitats from pollution
and encroachment by human activities."
85. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW
& POL'Y 355 (1987) (discussing the concept of regulatory culture).
86. This issue is briefly addressed in Jack Manno, Moderator Introduction, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 65 (Lynne S. Bankert & R. Warren Flint eds., 1988). See also
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 19-20 (1983).
87. See generally MINISTRY OF REVENUE TAXATION, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,
INFORMATION CIRCULAR NO. 80-10R, REGISTERED CHARITIES: OPERATING A
REGISTERED CHARITY (1985).
88. See generally COLBORN, supra note 56.
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The revival of the shipping industries and the Army Corps of
Engineers' interest in keeping the St. Lawrence Seaway open throughout
the winter months evoked considerable public protest. Normally, the
Seaway opens in early April and remains open until early December.
During the winter months, the Seaway's customers switch to rail, trucks,
and storage. Winter navigation would increase both the Seaway's
revenue season and its convenience and attractiveness to customers.
Thus, since the opening of the Seaway in the 1950s, proposals have been
regularly put forth to extend the season through the use of ice breakers
and underwater dams to keep locks and channels open.89 Just as
regularly, environmentalists and riverside residents have raised
concerns about such problems as accidental oil and chemical spills
dispersing beneath the ice and into bottom sediment, fish spawning
areas being scoured by ice churned under by passing boats, shoreline
being eroded by tanker wakes and broken ice, and disruption of a
variety of sensitive winter fish and wildlife habitats.
Despite the simple surface logic of winter navigation proposals, the
cost-benefit considerations were ludicrously out of balance. A variety of
woes had befallen the Great Lakes shipping industry, making it
inconceivable for the economic benefits from increased shipping and toll
receipts to ever outweigh the engineering maintenance costs required for
winter navigation. The proposed schemes reeked of pork barrel politics
and had little overt political support, even from the leaders of portside
communities." They represented, therefore, no entrenched powerful
economic forces at work, no workers to be displaced, and were, as a
result, good organizing targets.
The other perceived threat involved proposals to divert Great Lakes
water beyond basin boundaries to dry regions of the continent. A
variety of engineering schemes have been proposed at one time or
another using Great Lakes water for the purposes of irrigating
midwestern agriculture, moving western coal via a coal-slurry pipeline,
and most recently, to raise the Mississippi made shallow by drought.91
Threat of large-scale diversion was a primary concern in Canadian and
U.S. negotiations leading to the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909,9 and
has had the effect of highlighting the mutual economic interests of both
countries. Great Lakes officials began to see their abundant supply of
89. Id.
90. Interview with Daniel Green, Director, Societe pour le Vaincre de la
Pollution, in Ottawa Ont. (May 4, 1991).
91. See Michael J. Donahue et al., Great Lakes Diversion and Consumptive Use:
The Issue in Perspective, 18 J. INT'L L. 19, 19-48 (1986).
92. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9.
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water as a competitive advantage against the so-called Sunbelt-what
some editorial columnists in the Great Lakes region had come to call the
"Parchbelt"93 -and any talk of tapping into the Great Lakes water
supply were "fighting words."
The economies of the western United States and Canada have been
stimulated by oil and mineral production, irrigation, agriculture, and
tourism. At the same time, the Great Lakes economy has suffered a
steady decline in its heavy manufacturing-based industries. If the
availability of fresh water was to become a limiting factor for recently
expanding economies of the Sunbelt, then the Great Lakes, the world's
largest supply of surface liquid fresh water, could one day be the source
of more wealth than all the oil in Texas. With such visions in mind, the
states bordering the lakes eventually formed a Great Lakes Charter,
agreeing to consult with each other before any significant diversions
would be allowed.94
Proposals for winter navigation and out-of-basin diversions created
a sense of shared regional interest, and made fairly easy targets for
activists. Both issues involved future threats with potential costs
throughout the entire Great Lakes system which still could be averted
by proactive cooperation. Both had larger than life "bad guys"-- sunbelt
speculators and the Corps of Engineers-neither of which had the ability
or intention to act immediately on their proposal. There was nothing
inevitable about the proposals. The various engineering schemes
promised future, but highly speculative, profits. Wayne Schmidt, a staff
ecologist with Michigan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC), recognized
the difference between these natural coalition-building issues and other
more difficult concerns such as water quality: "Winter navigation was
a natural issue which brought all the entities together. But things
aren't always so clear cut. It's difficult to get people in Quebec and
Wisconsin to get together on water quality issues."9" The
ineffectiveness of some of these difficult problems in garnering public
support led to disputes within environmental organizations. The
disputes largely focused upon a balance between choosing issues most
important from an environmental perspective, and choosing those most
suitable for building broad coalitions.
For example, many environmental groups involved with the Great
Lakes during this nascent period, including the Lake Michigan
93. See, e.g., D. Gunner Carlson, Lakes Need a United Front, THE SAGINAW NEWS,
Dec. 3, 1982, at B2.
94. See generally WELLER, supra note 29.
95. Great Lakes Coalition Proposed by Group, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Dec. 1,
1981, at 1.
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Federation, Sierra Club, and Operation Clean Niagara, had the toxics
issue clearly on their agenda. From the perspective of organizing
regional cooperation among environmental advocacy groups, however,
winter navigation and diversion had several advantages over the more
complex problems of toxic contamination. Issues of diversion and winter
navigation, unlike issues of toxics, were variations on century-old
debates regarding management of public resources.' Positions of the
actors could be defined and variously interpreted according to the terms
of those experiences. Toxics, on the other hand, involved physical and
political factors which complicated advocacy groups' organizing
strategies. These complications were driven in part by the fact that
toxic substances get intothe ecosystem as the by-products and waste of
essentially every current major economic activity. The "bad guys" are
not distant schemers or government bullies, but are all around us.
Because toxic contamination is so ubiquitous and its sources so diffuse,
measuring its impact is complicated by the absence of an
uncontaminated "control" population or a "quiet" background against
which to measure the toxic noise. It is extremely difficult to locate
specific effects on human populations that can be directly attributable
to specific toxicants.
Quantities of toxics, although immense in the aggregate, are highly
diffuse and diluted in immense volumes of water. The costs of cleaning
up any single source are usually far greater than the benefits to be
derived from any individual clean-up when that clean-up's benefits are
measured as proportionate to the overall problem. Because clean-up is
so costly and inefficient, it is better to prevent pollution in the first
place. But pollution prevention requires process changes and life-style
adaptations that go to the heart of personal choices and economic
realities. As a result, pollution prevention may not be the best ground
on which to organize advocates across socio-economic, racial, and
cultural lines.
Finally, organizing around toxics issues is complicated by the threat
posed to the hunting, fishing, and tourism industries by widespread
public fear of toxic contamination. These industries form the economic
underpinning of sportsmen's clubs such as MUCC. Thus, although
governments' difficulties in addressing the issues of toxic contamination
opened the door for environmental advocacy, the complexities of the
issue also threatened to undermine the capacity of environmental NGOs
to attract broad constituencies.
96. There are several good analyses of the positions and concerns that
characterize the earlier conservation movement. See, e.g., SAMUEL HAYS, CONSERVA-
TION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT,
1890-1920 (1959).
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These problems plagued those who tried to organize around toxic
pollution. Despite these complications, however, improved understand-
ing of toxics led to growing acceptance by the scientific community,
governments, and advocacy groups of the necessity of an ecosystem
approach in stopping pollution. A major strategic shift resulted from the
realization that many of the localized problems had a common thread:
the degradation of the Great Lakes ecosystem as a whole. This shift
reflected a recognition that the individual components of the Great
Lakes ecosystem function together and that actions in one part may
result in unpredictable ramifications in another. This recognition
occurred in different ways for different organizations and regions, but
developed parallel to the articulation by the IJC and the Canadian and
U.S. water quality agencies of the need to take an ecosystem approach
to handling Great Lakes pollution.
In order to assert political power at the ecosystem level, the focus
of environmental advocacy needed to be at the level where decisions
affecting the entire ecosystem could be made. There was a growing
sense among scientists and policy experts, the "epistemic community" of
the Great Lakes, that the existing institutional structures were
incapable of resolving the crises facing the ecosystem.' Academic and
scientific meetings took on an increasingly political tone. It was in this
context that many Great Lakes environmental interest groups saw the
need to form an alliance despite their differences. The efforts to create
such an alliance constitute the early history of Great Lakes United and
demonstrate many of the forces that hold environmental coalitions
together and some of those that tend to break them apart.
B. Coalition Building
Tom Washington, the Executive Director of Michigan United
Conservation Clubs (MUCC), a state-wide coalition of sportsmen's and
conservation clubs with nearly 200,000 members, was among those who
believed that some kind of regional Great Lakes federation was needed.
In 1981, Washington and staff ecologist Wayne Schmidt foresaw a Great
Lakes organization based on the MUCC and National Wildlife Federa-
tion models of a coalition of like-minded organizations with a strong
central administration to address shared concerns across the basin.
In MUCC's first press release on the matter, issued in November
1981, Washington said he planned to establish a federation to protect
97. See Lynton Caldwell, Implementing an Ecological Systems Approach to
Basinwide Management; Leonard B. Dworsky, The Great Lakes: 1955-1985, in
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 45.
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and improve Great Lakes water quality. "This federation could be
instrumental in the long-term protection and improvement of Great
Lakes water quality through citizen action. It could be a valuable tool
in educating citizens and organizations in the Great Lakes basin about
the inter-relationship of the waters of the basin and the need for an
'ecosystem approach' to managing water and other natural resources of
the Great Lakes." 8
With a grant from the Joyce Foundation, the MUCC staff began the
process of bringing Great Lakes organizations together. However, as the
perception of common threats and mutual interests brought people
together, fears that their individual interests, styles, and philosophies
would be subsumed by a dominant central authority drove them apart.
Mixed with political disagreements and differences in organizational
styles was the involvement of several controversial and flamboyant
individuals.
C. Leadership and Organizational Structure
Differences in political styles and goals nearly aborted early efforts
to form a Great Lakes coalition organization. In the summer of 1982,
MUCC and the Joyce Foundation issued invitations to the leaders of
Great Lakes organizations to meet at Mackinac Island near the straights
dividing Lakes Huron and Michigan. Fifty-five delegates, from eight
states and two provinces, attended. The debate quickly centered on
what kind of organization should be created. Probably the most critical
dilemma facing the new coalition was the contradiction between the
decentralized nature of a diverse coalition and the need for strong
leadership to hold the group together while representing its many
interests. Tom Washington and others argued for the formation of a
strong regional organization that could advocate positions with a single
voice representing the scores of groups with environmental portfolios.
Many others saw a need for a central information clearinghouse and
networking node for existing groups, but feared a new organization
would compete with them for influence, funding, and members. The
issues of organizational structure were mirrored in leadership styles.
Tom Washington and Wayne Schmidt worked in, and were used to,
organizations with top-heavy, authoritarian decision-making styles,
whereas many of the environmental organizations involved early in the
Great Lakes coalition building promoted a more egalitarian, participato-
ry style.
98. Lakes Topic of Meeting, MINING JOURNAL, Nov. 21, 1981, at 7.
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The Mackinac meeting ended inconclusively with the issuance of a
consensus document. This document focused on the need for vigilance
against the threats of diversions and pollution. Additionally, an
agreement was reached to form an organization called Great Lakes
United (GLU), the structure and purpose of which were to be hammered
out at a second meeting six months later in Windsor, Ontario.
Organizational and personal issues came to a head at this Novem-
ber meeting in Windsor. One hundred and ten delegates representing
seventy groups from all the Great Lakes states and provinces agreed to
form a coalition. However, in coming to this agreement, they ousted
from leadership roles Tom Washington and Barry Freed (also known as
Abbie Hoffman), the most controversial figure in GLU's early history."
The decisions made regarding leadership and organizational structure,
as well as the skills honed in securing them, helped establish GLU
credibility and legitimacy in the basin.
1. Leadership. Representatives of the National Wildlife Federation,
the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, Toronto's Pollution Probe, the
binational education group Great Lakes Tomorrow, the League of
Women Voters, the Federation of Ontario Naturalists, Lake Michigan
Federation, and others joined in Windsor to reject a strong executive
director and an independent Board of Directors, favoring instead a
decentralized, organizational model structured around "task forces."
The idea behind the task forces was that of issue sectors: each task
force would be comprised of representatives from member organizations
interested in a specific issue. The task forces would recommend political
strategies to the coalition and sometimes carry out activities in the name
of the coalition. The task force structure would prevent a centralized
99. Abbie Hoffman had been a leading organizer of many of the highly publicized
displays of 1960s radicalism and a key figure in the loose network of theatrical
protesters known as the Yippies. He had an uncanny ability to broadcast his
brilliantly succinct political symbols by capturing the attention of America's
news-entertainment complex. Out of his ability to manipulate the national media,
he crafted a unique political philosophy and strategy, which he preached enthusiasti-
cally. Convicted of, and later exonerated for, inciting to riot in his role as one of the
leaders of anti-war demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in
Chicago, he went underground in 1972 to avoid cocaine trafficking charges which he
insisted were part of a frame-up. See generally THE BEST OF ABBIE HOFFMAN (Daniel
Simon & Abbie Hoffman eds., 1989). During his years in hiding he created, with
plastic surgery and short hair, the persona of Barry Freed, a St. Lawrence resident
and leader of the Save the River environmental organization. In 1980 he surrendered
to U.S. authorities and was released from prison in the Spring of 1982. Id. at 343-57.
As a representative of Save the River, he joined the meetings at Mackinac and
Windsor.
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authority from making decisions on behalf of the many local members.
The Detroit Free Press quoted Mimi Becker, Great Lakes Tomorrow
project manager, as saying, 'We won't have action done by some
executive director that goes running around from state to state. The
political action and the credibility must be implemented by local
groups. '1°
2. Organizational Model. There were concerns that organizations
with large memberships, such as the 100,000-member MUCC, would
crowd out smaller groups; that those organizations with hierarchical
structures, such as the labor unions, would dictate solid block votes; and
that groups such as Save the River, with media stars like Hoffman,
would end up speaking for the group. There was also concern about
gender equity and male-dominated leadership. Many of the groups
opposed to the centralized structure were represented by competent,
politically-astute women leaders: Glenda Daniel of the Lake Michigan
Federation, Carol Swineheart of the League of Women Voters, Jane
Elder of the Sierra Club, Pamela Chase of Pollution Probe, and Mimi
Becker of Great Lakes Tomorrow. They were suspicious of the
organizational leadership styles brought to GLU's founding by
Washington and Hoffman. Furthermore, concerned Canadians feared
that U.S. groups would dominate. The U.S. groups had initiated the
coalition-building process, obtained the initial grant money, and were
already larger and more powerful than their Canadian counterparts.
These concerns were played out in the structuring of the by-laws. The
debate over whether individuals or organizations should have
membership and voting privileges was really about whether large
organizations, like MUCC, could dominate. The debate over the role of
an executive director was really a referendum on the personalities and
styles of Washington and Hoffman.
Those favoring a strong executive argued that environmental
problems often require quick responses and that some central authority
needs to be empowered to act without the lengthy procedure of setting
up a task force for each problem. Proponents of a decentralized
structure, on the other hand, pointed to the Clean Air Coalition and the
coalition of groups that had fought the Alaskan oil pipeline as examples
of coalitions which still managed to respond quickly and were more
successful than authoritarian groups in arousing grass-roots support.
The decentralists won the day. By the end of the Windsor meeting, the
founding members of the new organization, Washington and Wayne
Schmidt, and their activist ally Abbie Hoffman, had been rebuffed.
100. David Everett, Great Lakes Coalition Born, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 22,
1982, at A3 [hereinafter Great Lakes Coalition Born].
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Washington and Hoffman threatened to pull their organizations out of
the coalition. Washington was quoted in the Bay City Times: "I don't
think we'll be really active participants in this organization. The
amendments (passed at Windsor to reduce central authority) take away
any strength or power to act in an expedient manner. ' '1  Abbie
Hoffman, quoted in the Detroit Free Press, was, as usual, more to the
point: "We are interested in political action. We're sick of groups that
sell newsletters."'e°
In the six months between the November 1982 Windsor meeting
and the first Annual Meeting of Great Lakes United in Detroit in May
1983, the mainstream conservation groups were able to agree to a set of
by-laws and policy statements. They also agreed on a president, Bob
Boice, a career employee of the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation and an officer in the New York State Conservation
Council (a 350,000-member coalition of sportsmen's clubs and a New
York affiliate of both the National Wildlife Federation and the National
Rifle Association). Boice, widely regarded as a consensus builder, could
not have been more removed from Abbie Hoffman in terms of manage-
ment style.
During the first GLU meeting, a series of policy resolutions was
adopted. In addition to taking stands against toxic pollution, winter
navigation, and diversions, the group declared its support for a
U.S.-Canadian Air Quality Agreement to eliminate acid rain, modeled
on the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The group also support-
ed the acquisition and improvement of national park lands in the Great
Lakes region, and opposed the Reagan Administration Interior Depart-
ment's parks policies. Finally, the group expressed its support for
renewal of clean-water and clean-air legislation in the U.S., and for
increased funding for Great Lakes research and water quality monitor-
ing.1
03
D. Strategizing and Gaining Leverage
Between the first annual meeting and the review and renegotiation
of the Water Quality Agreement in 1987, Great Lakes United grew
steadily in numbers and influence. By 1986, membership had grown to
over 200 diverse groups, some with hundreds or more of individual
101. Abbie Hoffman, MUCC Split With Great Lakes Group, THE BAY CITY TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1982, at 10A.
102. Great Lakes Coalition Born, supra note 100.
103. Great Lakes United, Resolution minutes, Annual Board Meeting, Detroit,
Mich. (May 7, 1983) (on file with Great Lakes United).
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members from the U.S. and Canada, all "striving for proper manage-
ment and protection of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River."1
A full-time executive director and support staff were hired, and
headquarters were established in Buffalo, New York at Medaille College.
Plans were under way to open a Canadian office in Windsor, Ontario.
1. Strategy. As noted earlier, the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement"' s was scheduled for formal review in 1987. The leadership
of Great Lakes United saw this review as an opportunity to draw
attention to the Agreement's principles, which it believed were still
largely ignored by the Parties. Because GLU was a relatively new voice
in the basin, its officers had been considering a "tour" of the lakes, in the
form of public meetings throughout the basin similar in scope and intent
to the PLUARG meetings." s
The idea for a tour originated in 1985 as a way to promote
membership in GLU. By the following year, the concept converged with
the officers' concerns about the upcoming scheduled review of the
Agreement. There seemed to be reason to worry about the fate of the
Agreement under review. The Reagan White House and Prime Minister
Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government in Ottawa were
perceived to be hostile to federal action on behalf of the
environment-the very kind promised by the Agreement.
John Jackson, a veteran organizer around issues of toxic waste
dumps in the Province of Ontario, and a Great Lakes United activist,
suggested that GLU, rather than just doing a promotional tour, should
organize a series of "public hearings" around the basin to gather
testimony regarding government progress in implementing the Agree-
ment. The "hearings" were intended to raise GLU's profile in the region,
build a base of support for the principles and goals of the
Agreement,1" and preempt and prompt U.S. and Canadian
government officials who had not yet discussed publicly their plans for
the upcoming Agreement review.
104. Great Lakes United (informational brochure, on file with author).
105. See 1978 GLWQA, supra note 1.
106. Although the level of public participation and type of input differed, in both
instances participation was sought basin-wide from both Canada and the U.S. to gain
public support and credibility. The PLUARG and the GLU meetings differed
somewhat in the public sectors involved and in the final documentation. However,
the general success of each in attaining its objectives greatly influenced subsequent
bilateral negotiations. Becker Interview, supra note 45.
107. Cf INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, POLLUTION IN THE GREAT LAKES
BASIN FROM LAND USE ACTIVITIES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 5 (1980).
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The GLU Board of Directors approved the concept of the citizen
hearings and established a Water Quality Task Force under GLU
by-laws. The task force sought and received funding from the C.S. Mott
and Joyce Foundations. GLU also hired a Water Quality Task Force
coordinator, Tim Eder, who later became one of GLU's representatives
on the U.S. team for the Agreement renegotiations. Before joining GLU,
Eder had worked with Save the River in upstate New York.
Eder and GLU organized nineteen "Citizen Hearings on Great
Lakes Water Pollution" in cities across the Great Lakes basin. GLU
estimates that over 1,200 people attended, of which 382 made state-
ments at the hearings or mailed in comments. Members of the GLU
task force received testimony from residents, and joined with local
organizations and reporters on tours, often in boats, to witness
environmental problems in their area. They saw open piles of coal, salt,
and scrap iron lining the banks of the Milwaukee Harbor, feeding lead,
chromium, mercury, arsenic, and phenols to the Harbor's already
contaminated sediments. In Green Bay, they toured paper mills where
polychlorobenzene was legally discharged in pulp mill waste water.
From their boat, GLU task force members were shown several waste
dumps on the shores of Lake Superior at Duluth. In Massena, New
York, the group toured the St. Lawrence River near the General Motors
and Alcoa industrial waste sites where they heard a New York
Department of Environmental Conservation official describe the
"contaminant plume of considerable proportion migrating from the
industrial landfill and discharging to the St. Lawrence River." 108
These scenes were repeated throughout the nineteen stops on the
tour. The testimony gathered was emotional and dramatic. "What we
pump down the sewers this week will end up in our cornflakes next year
and eventually in my blood and fatty tissues," argued a witness in
Toronto. 109 A Native American leader in Cornwall said that Native
American families used to eat 20 to 30 pounds of fish every week but
now they warn children and women not to eat any fish because the flesh
is contaminated. ° A deformed cormorant found locally was at the
hearing table in Green Bay. In Montreal, biologists studying the decline
of Beluga whale populations in the St. Lawrence estuary reported
108. WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE, GREAT LAKES UNITED, UNFULFILLED
PROMISES: A CITIZENS REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT 19-20 (1987) [hereinafter UNFULFILLED PROMISES].
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 19.
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finding whale carcasses with high concentrations of PCBs, mirex, and
dioxin in their flesh."'
2. Taking a Stand: Great Lakes United's Position. From the citizen
hearings, GLU compiled a review of its findings and recommenda-
tions:' that governments act seriously on commitments to end the
release of persistent toxic substances into the lakes; that governments
and the International Joint Commission better inform the public on
water-quality issues and involve citizens on all levels of water-quality
decision-making; that more research be conducted on human health
effects of toxics at levels found in the lakes; that new chemicals be
tested for toxicity and persistence before they are allowed to be
manufactured and used; that methods be improved for eliminating in-
place pollutants in contaminated sediments; that the practices of
overflow dredging and open-lake disposal of contaminated dredge spoils
be ended; and, that the International Joint Commission become more
active in government programs and involve the public in all aspects of
IJC work.
The first recommendation in the report addressed the scheduled
1987 Protocol. According to the report:
Most of those who spoke at the hearings emphasized the need
for immediate actions to correct water quality problems.
Renegotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement at
this time would mean the diversion of resources and a resul-
tant delay in addressing these problems. In addition, many
speakers expressed little faith in the Reagan and Mulroney
administrations' commitment to protecting the environment.
They feared that if opened up for renegotiation at this time,
the Agreement would be weakened.
These two concerns combined with statements from all
Parties at the hearings that the Agreement is a document that
encourages positive actions and does not discourage such
action, leads the GLU Task Force to conclude that the Agree-
ment should not be renegotiated now.
Therefore, the GLU Task Force recommends that the
two federal governments not renegotiate the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement at this time." 3
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 47-79.
113. Id. at 6-7, 49.
[Vol. 1
1993] BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 39
GLU's resistance to tampering with the Agreement echoed the
sentiments of the participants at the hearings, as well as the conclusion
drawn by a study committee of the Royal Society of Canada and the
National Research Council of the United States (RSC-NRC) which had
reviewed the Agreement in 1984.114 Both the scientific and
environmental advocates' reviews concluded that the GLWQA was
fundamentally sound and required implementation by the Parties rather
than renegotiation and amendment.' Both reports were made widely
available to governments and the media. According to Ron Shimizu,
who was responsible for Environment Canada's implementation of the
GLWQA, GLU's emphasis on the positive features of the Agreement
which must not be tampered with, "set the tone, the public parameters
of acceptability around which the governments could conduct a
review. '
3. Party Positions. Despite GLU's anxiety that opening the
Agreement to negotiations at this time could be a prelude to disaster
and a greatly weakened Agreement, the individual environmental
officials in charge of the review-Ron Shimizu of Canada, and E.P.A.'s
Kent Fuller of the U.S.-were committed to the basic framework of the
Agreement and communicated that sentiment to each other." Both
believed that the GLWQA could benefit from two kinds of amendments:
technical changes that would specify governmental commitments to
respond to emerging pollution problems; and management changes that
would clarify roles and make the governments more accountable for
their commitments by linking the goals of the GLWQA more closely with
specific program elements.
114. The result was the NRC-RSC Report, supra note 32, issued in 1985. It has
been described by leading non-governmental scientific organizations as a major
binational collaborative assessment of the ecosystem approach as committed under
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements. See Don Munton, Toward a More
Accountable Process: The Royal Society-National Research Council Report, in
Caldwell, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 299-317 [hereinafter Munton]. Munton
summarizes the recommendations and conclusions of the report. Regarding Great
Lakes institutions, he observes that an ecosystem approach can be achieved through
changes in the "processes" of governance rather than the "structures" of governance,
thus requiring greater accountability on commitments made to the public under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements. The report, he notes, calls for
"responsibilities and commitments of the governments to be made clear and
unambiguous." Id.
115. See, e.g., NRC-RSC Report, supra note 32.
116. Telephone Interview with Ron Shimizu, Faculty Member, University of
Toronto Institute of Environmental Studies (Aug. 20, 1991).
117. Interview with Ron Shimizu, supra note 116, in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 18, 1992).
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Although most of the public comment and review centered on
specific pollution-related problems, the bureaucrats charged with
preparing their government's positions for the negotiations were also
concerned about water quality management issues, specifically, the
vague distribution of responsibilities between the IJC and the
governments. Kent Fuller wanted to modify the GLWQA so that its
lofty goals would be explicitly related to federal water quality programs
and commitments in each country. As the Agreement stood on the eve
of its review, goals were established and the IJC reported on progress,
but there were few practical mechanisms to tie the goals to particular
programs. This lack of accountability further complicated what was
already a daunting evaluation task.118
One of the binational programs with the highest profile, and the
program of most concern to many of the people who had spoken at the
Great Lakes United hearings, was the Remedial Action Plan (RAP)
program initiated by the IJC Water Quality Board in 1985.119 The
program called for cleanup plans to be developed for each of forty-two
locations across the U.S. and Canada, the most heavily polluted rivers
and harbors, designated "Areas of Concern."
4. Remedial Action Plans. It is necessary to consider at this point
the history and recent evolution of the RAP program. In many ways,
the process of developing and implementing RAPs reflects trends in the
relationships between non-governmental organizations, intergov-
ernmental organizations like the IJC, national governments, and state,
provincial, and local jurisdictions.
The Remedial Action Plan program marks a departure from the
traditional IJC activities. In the past, the IJC made recommendations
only when both governments asked for specific studies. The type of
recommendations and the range of information expected by the
governments was clearly delineated in the reference, or request, issued
jointly by the two national governments. Because both nations had to
agree before any issue could be referred to the Commission, referenced
issues tended to be those in which mutual interests were considerable
and obvious. Care was taken not to appear to threaten national
sovereignty. In fact, some observers have credited the Commission's
118. Interview with Kent Fuller, supra note 23, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 19,
1991).
119. See generally GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BOARD, INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE GREAT LAKEs RAP PROGRAM (1991).
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steadfast avoidance of bilateral conflict through the reference procedure
for its longevity and success."
Prior to the RAP program, the IJC acted for the most part only at
the behest of the federal governments. An apt phrase used to describe
this relationship might be: the governments do and the commissioners
review. The RAP program represented a different tack in that the IJC,
through its Water Quality Board, in effect directed the Parties to
develop cleanup plans. The IJC determined what should be in a RAP,
what criteria should be applied in evaluating the RAP, and what
constituted adequate public consultation and citizen participation. In
addition, individual IJC staff members, by becoming involved in local
watershed planning, were developing professional, personal, and political
relationships with community activists and local and state officials who
were charged with producing the RAPs. By becoming involved in water
quality planning processes at subnational levels, the IJC risked being
perceived by the Parties as overreaching its mandate and meddling in
sovereign affairs.
The IJC found itself in a conundrum. The severe but localized
contamination in the areas of concern posed a limit on further progress
in Great Lakes cleanup. Unless water quality in these areas was
improved, the objectives of the GLWQA were not likely to be achieved.
But the areas of concern were by definition local problems requiring
local efforts and investment to remediate. How could the IJC, an
international body responsible to the federal governments, motivate local
communities to take responsibility for their piece of the ecosystem? It
seemed crucial to involve as many influential parts of the community as
possible. The IJC in 1987 recommended that "all levels of government
take steps to foster community support and involvement in developing
and implementing the remedial action plans." '' According to the IJC:
"[E]ach citizen can play a valuable role in the RAP process, by contribut-
ing information on Areas of Concern and providing support for the
development and implementation of the plan. This endeavor can only
be successful if a concerned public is involved in developing and
implementing each remedial action plan."'"
By encouraging public participation in remedial action plans, the
IJC was, in the environmental politics of the late 1980s, necessarily
120. E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 52-55.
121. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA AND THE STATE AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE
GREAT LAKES BASIN 30 (1987).
122. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, REMEDIAL ACTION PLANS FOR AREAS OF
CONCERN (informational brochure, on file with author).
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becoming involved with environmental activists and activism. It was
carving out new relationships between jurisdictions and citizens in an
unprecedented way.
The IJC was not necessarily interested in participatory democracy
as an end in itself, nor as any principled political position."2 Rather,
the IJO sought a means to gain support for its preferred policies, those
based on an ecosystem approach to RAPs. Each RAP must embody a
comprehensive ecosystem approach to restoring and protecting beneficial
uses in the area of concern.124 The kind of public participation sought
by the IJC officials promoting RAPs was the sort provided by an
involved constituency. The burden of promoting the RAPs, therefore, fell
to local environmental activists with recognized interests and credibility
who also shared a personal sense of responsibility broad enough to
include the Great Lakes ecosystem as a whole. These characteristics
and profiles describe many of the local activists involved in Great Lakes
United member organizations and other environmental NGOs. Thus, to
make the RAPs work as intended, the IJC found itself in alliance with
local environmental activists, at the risk of alienating some of the very
state and local officials responsible for delivering a RAP to the IJC.125
123. See Swineheart, supra note 52 (reviewing participation in International
Joint Commission public hearings).
124. For further discussion of RAPs, see generally JOHN H. HARTIG & MICHAEL
ZARULL, UNDER RAPS: TOWARD GRASSROOTS ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GREAT
LAKES BASIN (1992); Barry B. Boyer, Creating, Managing and Postponing Conflict
Through Remedial Action Plans, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION 94-110 (W. Flint & L.S. Bankert eds., 1988).
125. This trend continued beyond the period discussed here. The 1989 Biennial
meeting of the IJC was dominated by Great Lakes activists. More than 800 people
were in attendance, many of them brought in for the event by Greenpeace, which had
recently organized a Great Lakes International office. Greenpeace had promised to
hold a separate meeting at the time of the IJC Biennial to protest, and perhaps
disrupt the official meetings. In a move to preempt that scenario, Greenpeace's
spokesperson, Joyce McLean, was invited by the IJC to give the keynote address.
Her speech was preceded by a ritual procession of puppets and banners representing
the fish and wildlife harmed by toxic pollution. The contrasts between the
countercultural rite and the pomp and circumstance of an official international
gathering replete with color guard and plenty of flags was strikingly worthy of the
legacy of Abbie Hoffman. From the podium, Joyce McLean chided the Commissioners
by stating that rarely were their recommendations heeded by the Parties. Perhaps,
she suggested, they should resign. Instead, the IJC issued a report on the 1989
meeting in which it said, in addition to the comment which heads this study, "the
increasing level of public concern for the Great Lakes ecosystem and insistence on
governmental response to Agreement objectives were strikingly evident, and
outspokenly vented, at the Commission's recent Biennial meeting." IJC FIFTH
BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. The fact that Joyce McLean's comments were
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The Commission's difficulties resulted from a contradiction inherent
in the RAP program and its ecosystem approach: benefits accrue to the
entire ecosystem while the costs are borne disproportionately at the local
level. The RAP program was intended to make progress in polluted
areas of concern that consistently failed to meet the water quality
objectives of the Agreement. The ecological significance of some of these
hot-spots was primarily in their basin-wide impact. However, the
political significance was in the fact that a local community would be
asked to shoulder the responsibilities of planning and implementing an
expensive clean-up program which would be unlikely to result in any
substantial local benefit. Furthermore, many of the hot-spots were
heavily industrialized or otherwise degraded areas which lacked a
politically powerful resident constituency. The IJC-designated areas
may compete as well with other environmental problems in the local
area, some of which might be more visible, or have more direct impact
on the local community. The success of many of the RAPs may depend
in the end on the IJC's ability to build environmentally astute
community advocates in the RAP areas. Such a condition for success for
one of the IJC's most cherished programs could easily lead to govern-
mental efforts to reign in the scope of the Commission's activities.
This tug and pull between the governments and the IJC was
nothing particularly new. Ever since its first reference reports on water
pollution early in the century, the Commissioners have occasionally
recommended increased authority for the IJC. In 1981, the Commission
proposed a new and expanded role for itself beyond its traditional role
as scientific and technical advisor to the governments, 126 suggesting
something like the role it adopted for itself in the RAP program. This
recommendation was rejected by the Office of Canadian Affairs in the
U.S. State Department which told the IJC that, "rather than a broaden-
ing of the Commission's Great Lakes focus as proposed, the State
Department believes that the Commission should continue to devote its
memorable could be seen at the 1991 Biennial when the U.S. Chairman of the IJC,
Gordon Durnil, referred to them several times as being responsible for his personal
reconsideration of his role as a Commissioner. The 1991 Biennial was also
noteworthy for the number of times the Commissioners reminded the public that the
IJC's role was merely advisory, and that the Commissioners had no power to
implement the programs that some activists were urging. Ironically, Joyce McLean
attended the 1991 Biennial as a newly appointed official in the environment ministry
of the Ontario Provincial government.
126. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIsSION, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 30 (1982).
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efforts with greater precision to the technical questions specified in the
1978 Agreement."127
The National Research Council/Royal Society of Canada (NRC/RSC)
report was also critical of the IJC's expanded role, in particular the
Water Quality Board. The report recommended that "the coordinating
responsibilities for the control programs that implement the Agreement
be left to the Parties, rather than to the Water Quality Board. This
coordination should be handled through bilateral govern-
ment-to-government meetings.""z According to one commentator, the
purpose of the NRC/RSC criticisms was not to reduce the Commission's
importance, but rather to increase its independence, and therefore its
effectiveness. Governments should clearly be responsible and
accountable for the commitments they make under the Agreement."
By the time of the 1987 Protocol, the RAP program had become one
of the most active water quality efforts in both countries. Yet, prior to
the 1987 Protocol, the program itself was not institutionalized in the
body of the GLWQA. Thus, a major Great Lakes anti-pollution effort
was outside the official agreement framework, a kind of rogue influence,
posing serious structural and political challenges to the water-quality
bureaucracies in both countries and all the states and provinces. The
RAP program bore the burden of relying almost exclusively on popular
political support for its legitimacy.
Professionals associated with the program wanted to ensure
governmental accountability for the RAPs and connect RAP programs to
specific and measurable endpoints in order to strengthen their legitima-
cy and raise their ranking on government priority lists."3 The RAP
situation added to the sense that management functions under the
GLWQA needed clarification, and that the specific responsibilities for
developing and implementing RAPs needed to be expressed and
embraced by the governments through the Agreement. It was among
the goals of both the Canadian and U.S. governments, therefore, to add
specific language to the Agreement to formally incorporate the RAPs
into the GLWQA. With such language, the Parties would be able to
127. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION'S FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT OF 1978 (Feb. 1978), quoted in Joseph T. Jockel & Alan M. Schwartz,
The Changing Environmental Role of the Canada-United States International Joint
Commission, 8 ENVTL. REV. 236, 247 (1984).
128. NRC-RSC Report, supra note 32, at 11-12.
129. Munton, supra note 114, at 300.
130. Interview with Kent Fuller, supra note 23, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 19,
1991).
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reassert their authority over the planning process, even if the Annex
fully accommodated the original IJC guidelines.
E. Great Lakes United's Concerns
In reviewing the GLWQA, GLU advocates expressed complex and
contradictory opinions on the role of the IJC. On one hand, the IJC
provided a focal point for the many water quality activities in the basin.
Its mandate from the 1909 Boundary Water Treaty preceded and was
not unlike what GLU understood its mandate to be: looking out for the
interests of the entire watershed against the parochial regional and
national interests throughout the basin.1 On the other hand, the IJC
had no authority to take meaningful regulatory or cleanup action, and
little authority in the way of financial resources. Responsibilities that
were left to the IJC, it was feared, would be those the governments
preferred to avoid. GLU and other NGOs preferred an IJC which could
and would prod the governments and apply, where appropriate, the
pressure of public concern to goad the Parties, states, and provinces into
action.
These contradictory opinions were never really debated or resolved
in the strategy deliberations within the organization. Instead, most of
the effort was put into achieving the goal of protecting the Agreement
from what was feared might be cynical maneuvers by the conservative
governments of both Canada and the U.S. For the most part the IJC
was perceived by GLU strategists as another governmental institution
to be lobbied. The goal of GLU's lobbying was to convince the Commis-
sioners to take an activist stance in promoting environmentalist
positions before the governments. The fact that the IJC was, as a treaty
organization, a creature of governments and not likely to be successful
as an independent activist organization, was of little concern to the
activists.132
The stance taken by both Parties in preparation for the 1987
Protocol was not publicly critical of the IJC. Their position instead was
that accountability and management for Agreement activities and
responsibilities needed to be made explicit. The review and renegotia-
tion provided an opportunity to clarify roles and responsibilities.
Nonetheless, while representatives of several government agencies,
states, and provinces participated with the citizen group representatives,
the absence from the negotiations of IJC representatives, even as
131. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9.
132. See John Jackson & Tim Eder, GLUHearings Draw Citizen's, Recommenda-
tions, GREAT LAKES UNITED, Fall 1986, at 1-2.
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technical advisors, was noteworthy."3  As we shall see, the 1987
Protocol eventually adopted reasserted the primacy of the Parties over
the IJC in Agreement activities and placed the future of the IJC as an
effective binational organization into question.
134
IV. THE 1987 REVIEW AND RENEGOTIATION OF THE GLWQA
Great Lakes United's citizen hearings and the widely publicized
NRC/RCS review of the GLWQA increased the Agreement's profile and
made it clear to U.S. and Canadian environmental agencies that a vocal
and organized constituency supported the Agreement's purposes. As a
result, beginning early in 1987, both sides went to unprecedented
lengths to include the public from the beginning stages of the review
process. Shortly after the Parties began preparing draft position
statements and proposed amendments, they consulted with a range of
public representatives.
In Canada, both the federal and provincial environment agencies,
including their top administrators, held meetings with citizens groups
to discuss the Agreement. Even preliminary drafts of amendments
which the Canadian government was considering proposing to the
American government were given to key Canadian environmentalists for
review and comment. Environment Canada and the Ontario Ministry
of the Environment (MOE) co-hosted an open workshop in July attended
by scientists, representatives of labor, government agencies, industry
associations, attorneys, environmental groups, native groups, and
educational institutions. Advance materials were circulated discussing
possible amendment areas, including RAPs, groundwater contamination,
133. The Canadian and American co-chairs of the IJC Water Quality Board,
Elizabeth Dowdswell and Val Adamkus, while present at the negotiations,
represented other agencies, such as Environment Canada, and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, respectively.
134. The IJC's position has eroded since the signing of the 1987 Protocol. The
United States in particular appears to have withdrawn some support from the IJC.
This can be seen in the limited participation of senior officials from federal and state
agencies in the RAPs. IJC officials have had increasing difficulty obtaining necessary
information from U.S. government agencies relative to monitoring the GLWQA
objectives. As a result of the 1987 Protocol's shifting of reporting responsibilities to
the governments, the IJC dissolved its committee structure, where governmental
officials had traditionally contributed their support to IJC activities. Present
Activities and Future Needs of Federal Programs Directed at Improving the Water
Quality of the Great Lakes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography, Great
Lakes and the Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991) (statement of Jack Manno, Associate
Director, Great Lakes Research Consortium).
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air-borne pollutants, contaminated sediments, and research needs.
Following the workshops, Environment Canada and MOE held public
meetings in Kingston, Windsor, and Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario.
The U.S. also provided opportunities for public comment on the
American positions. However, these opportunities, in general, were less
organized and attended by fewer people than the public meetings in
Canada.1" Nevertheless, draft positions were widely circulated, both
in original amendment form, and later in an Annex version. This was
in response to the widely expressed opinion that changes should only be
made in Annexes. The draft amendments were also circulated for
comment to interested federal and state agencies. A U.S. caucus was
organized to derive a position for negotiations with the Canadians. It
included representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Coast Guard, Office of Management and Budget, Army Corps of
Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The eight
Great Lakes states each were involved through representatives
appointed by the states' governors. Three of these states were chosen
by the others to represent the eight as participants in the U.S. caucus
and in the binational negotiations. According to a summary of the
review process:
Review of the Agreement quickly reached consensus on five
conclusions which served as assumptions throughout the
process of drafting amendments.
- Existing Agreement is basically sound.
- The purpose and general goals and objectives must not be
changed.
- It would be desirable to bring the Agreement up-to-date.
- It would be desirable to tighten accountability and manage-
ment.
- Review and amendment must be completed quickly to
avoid diverting resources from implementing the existing
Agreement.1"
After it became clear that the governments intended to proceed with
some changes to the Agreement, GLU's leaders shifted strategy. They
no longer insisted that the Agreement remain untouched, though they
continued to express that preference. They also urged that, if the
135. Swineheart, supra note 52, at 146.
136. Interview with Kent Fuller, supra note 23, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 21,
1991).
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Agreement was to be altered, formal amendments to the body of the
Agreement be avoided by placing all changes in Annexes. Furthermore,
if changes were to be proposed, they should be considered with the full
participation of the public. Great Lakes United's leadership summarized
the position GLU had presented to U.S. and Canadian officials and
explained:
The reason we insist on new Annexes only is simple: to protect
the strong provisions of the existing Agreement, such as zero
discharge and virtual elimination of persistent toxic substanc-
es, from being weakened. We believe that the only thing that
should be on the negotiating table is new Annexes or supple-
ments to existing Annexes.... The public should have a major
role in the actual negotiations. GLU has petitioned officials in
both countries to grant representatives of organizations such
as GLU 'observer status' in the negotiations.""13
A belief in environmental advocacy through participatory democracy
had been central to GLU's political principles. This belief rested on the
assumption that unless meaningful public participation was broadly
encouraged, the only interests represented and articulated in the
decision-making discourse would be those with the most at stake
financially and professionally, such as regulated industries, polluters
(especially past polluters, the so-called responsible parties), polluters'
consultants, and the professional staff of the environmental agencies.
According to this view, even when government agency personnel are
inclined to defend the public's health and welfare and its right to a
healthy environment, they are often overwhelmed by the short-term
logic of economic expediency. The instinct of the civil servant to
represent broader public interests has to be supported, encouraged, and,
where absent, demanded. This, GLU believes, is one of the roles of the
environmental advocate in the decision-making process.
Even when governments undertake public participation and public
consultation activities, they often do so in a manner suggesting that
government's responsibility is to strike a balance between competing
stakeholder interests. This suggests that all stakeholder interests are
of equal value, and that each stakeholder has equal power, ability, and
motivation to articulate and defend his or her interests. Yet stakeholder
rights and interests are multidimensional, and neither power nor costs
137. Memorandum from John Jackson, Vice-President of Great Lakes United,
and Tim Eder, Staff Member of the National Wildlife Federation, to People Interested
in the Future of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Sept. 10, 1987) (on file
with author).
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and benefits are equally distributed. Furthermore, in the view of
environmentalists, the right to pollution-free waters should be given
more weight than the right to use those waters to discharge wastes.
One way for a government to clarify rights, responsibilities, and
overriding interests is to articulate in a public document a set of
principles and goals to which that government is committed. This kind
of statement could embody overriding principles and, where those
principles are inimical to certain special interests and privileges, they
ought not be weakened to accommodate those special interests. The
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is just such a document, and as
an international agreement, it has the additional authority created by
the history of bilateral relations and mutual treaty obligations.
GLU recognized the importance of the GLWQA as a statement of
principles and placed significant organizational emphasis on defending
it. When GLU first approached administrators in EPA and Environ-
ment Canada requesting to be part of the binational review and
amendment process, it was a bold, if understandable, move. Direct
participation by NGOs in binational affairs was rare, but not without
precedent. Mark Van Putten, a lawyer and Director of the National
Wildlife Federation's Great Lakes Natural Resources Center, knew of a
migratory waterfowl treaty between Alaska and Canada in which certain
sportsmen's groups affiliated with the Wildlife Federation had officially
participated.' 1 According to Tim Eder, it was a crucial realization
and, based on Van Putten's example, GLU began to insist with
increasing confidence that the governments give GLU's representatives
a seat at the negotiating table.
1 39
GLU's case was straightforward. Its leaders had always demanded
that citizens be part of the decision-making process. Now that decisions
were being made at the bilateral level, their demand would be the same.
It sincerely believed that as a result of the success of its citizens
hearings it had earned the right to represent and advocate broad citizen
interest in the negotiation. It felt obligated to the people who had
testified at the public hearings to make sure their opinions regarding
the Agreement were heard. GLU believed that it and other environmen-
tal advocacy groups represented interests shared across the internation-
al boundary that were broader or more fundamental than specific
national interests. These interests have been referred to those of the
"Great Lakes constituency." This formulation was, and still is, inherent
138. Interview with Mark Van Putten, Director, National Wildlife Federation, in
Chicago, Ill. (May 14, 1991).
139. Interview with Tim Eder, supra note 70, in Traverse City, Mich. (Sept. 28,
1991).
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to GLU's existence as a binational1 citizens group whose identity (even,
perhaps, its definition of homeland) consists of an ecological region with
watershed frontiers rather than political borders. GLU's participation
in the bilateral review and negotiations would, therefore, represent a
fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the nation-state system for
issues of environmental protection, even if the Parties involved did not
necessarily view GLU's participation in that way.
Once GLU had decided to petition officials of both governments for
representation, according to GLU's Tim Eder, "[we] had to pull out all
the stops and play every card in our bag to get a seat at the table. That
didn't just happen."14 The campaign to gain observer status began in
June 1987. GLU wrote letters to the foreign ministries and environ-
mental agencies of both countries. For several months, it received
neither an answer nor even an acknowledgment of its request. GLU let
both governments know that it was going to persist until an answer was
received.
One decisive tactic was that all the NGOs represented (Sierra Club,
NWF, and GLU) had built alliances with many of Great Lakes represen-
tatives in Congress and the Senate. GLU contacted congressional
supporters, particularly Congressmen Overstar (D-MI) and Nowak
(D-NY), who had been leaders in Congress on several Great Lakes
issues, and asked them to intercede with the State Department on their
behalf. Furthermore, the Senate Great Lakes delegation circulated a
letter among the Northeast-Midwest Congressional delegation stating:
"[W]e recommend that some community-based citizen group be given
observer status at these discussions."'
141
GLU also leveraged the positions of the two federal environmental
agencies. Ron Shimizu of Environment Canada told Eder and Jackson
that his agency did not have a problem with GLU's request for observer
status, but that he believed the U.S. would not agree. Then, in
discussions with EPA's Kent Fuller, Eder and Jackson reported what
Environment Canada had said, hoping to encourage Fuller to support
their request. 4 When GLU appealed to the U.S. State Department
directly, according to Eder, officials there never discussed environmental
issues, but instead expressed foreign policy concerns about their desire
not to complicate U.S.-Canadian relations by involving the NGOs in the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Interview with John Jackson, President, Great Lakes United, in Walpole
Island, Ont. (July 12, 1991); Interview with Tim Eder, supra note 70, in Traverse
City, Mich. (Sept. 28, 1991); Interview with Ron Shimizu, supra note 116, in Chicago,
Ill. (Jan. 18, 1992).
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negotiation. A parallel lobbying effort was undertaken in Canada.
Canadian GLU representatives met with Canadian Environmental
Minister Tom McMillan as well as Elizabeth Dowdswell and Ron
Shimizu, senior bureaucrats in Environment Canada.
In the end, the campaign was successful. According to EPA's Fuller
who was on a on full time assignment to develop EPA's position for the
GLWQA review, the NGOs had successfully convinced him and others
within the EPA that NGOs were interested in "cooperating, not disrupt-
ing."' The personality of Fred Jones Hall, the State Department
official given responsibility for the GLWQA review, also played a major
role in sanctioning NGO participation. Hall, new to the State Depart-
ment, was a successful Texas businessman with a "can-do" attitude. He
informed EPA members of the U.S. delegation that he would rely on
EPA's technical advice. After considering the precedents cited by Van
Putten, Hall agreed to invite NGO observers to the official U.S.
delegation. Similarly, the Canadian Department of External Affairs
relied on Environment Canada's judgment.' Minister of the Environ-
ment Tom McMillan wrote to Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External
Affairs, in August, stating, "Although I realize that it is unusual to
involve the public directly in government-to-government consultative
sessions, I believe that the presence of GLU would be useful."'45
The Canadian letter of invitation came from Joe Clark, dated
September 24, 1987, and was addressed to John Jackson, Canadian Vice
President of Great Lakes United. In the letter the Secretary states:
I am well aware of the work your organization has done in
conducting an independent review of the Agreement and of
your concern that the Great Lakes be adequately protected
from pollution.
... [W]e see merit in using the review to try and
strengthen the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement by
introducing changes to it in several areas. In keeping with the
advice given to governments by the IJC, the Royal Society of
Canada/National Research Council of the United States of
America and Great Lakes United, we have endeavored to keep
key principles and provisions of this basically sound Agreement
intact.
143. Interview with Kent Fuller, supra note 23.
144. Interview with Ron Shimizu, supra note 116, in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 18, 1992).
145. John Jackson, Citizen Involvement in the Review of the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement 6 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Citizen Involvement].
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With respect to your request for observer status at the
bilateral review, you will appreciate that the presence of a
binational nongovernmental group at the formal review of an
international agreement by its signatories raises some interest-
ing issues of propriety and precedent. Nonetheless, in view of
Great Lakes United's credentials as a serious and responsible
group and our collective interest in ensuring the best possible
review of the Agreement, I am pleased to invite you and one
other member of the Canadian section of Great Lakes United
to participate as observers to the Canadian delegation.
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The GLU Board selected Kate Davies, a member of the Board of
Directors and the head of the City of Toronto's Department of
Environmental Health, to be the other Canadian GLU representative.
The U.S. State Department's invitation came at the very last minute,
only nine days before the caucus meeting where the U.S. negotiating
position would be finalized. It was addressed to David Miller, GLU's
executive director, and did not specify who the observer should be. In
separate letters, the State Department also invited the Sierra Club and
the National Wildlife Federation to send observers.147 Eder believed
that the most important event leading to the formal invitation of U.S.
observers occurred in August at an EPA-organized public hearing on the
Agreement held in Buffalo, New York. State Department
representatives attending this meeting heard testimony from GLU and
from others speaking favorably of GLU's leadership.
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The letter from the U.S. State Department came from Fred Jones
Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, dated September 30, 1987. Unlike the letter from Canada, it
expressed no particular acknowledgment of GLU's efforts or its
qualifications for participation. It began, "I would like to give you an
update on the U.S. Government review of the 1978 Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement and invite you to name an observer to our upcoming
negotiations with Canada." '14 9 The remainder of the letter detailed the
schedule of upcoming meetings.
146. Joe Clark Letter, supra note 2.
147. Interview with Tim Eder, supra note 70, in Traverse City Mich. (Sept. 28,
1991); Interview with John Jackson, supra note 142.
148. Interview with Tim Eder, supra note 70, in Traverse City Mich. (Sept. 28,
1991).
149. Letter from Fred Hall Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to David Miller, Executive Director of
Great Lakes United (Sept. 30, 1987) (on file with the Buffalo Environmental Law
Journal).
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Tim Eder, who had been hired as a Field Coordinator to manage the
citizen hearings, was appointed by the GLU Board as GLU's U.S.
observer. Mark Van Putten, Director of National Wildlife Federation's
Great Lakes Natural Resources Center, represented NWF. Jane Elder,
Great Lakes regional Vice-President, represented Sierra Club.
Once they became members of the national delegations, the NGO
observers had to pledge to abide by the requirements for confidentiality.
This raised difficult problems for observers on both sides of the table.
For example, GLU members John Jackson of Canada and Tim Eder of
the U.S. had regularly conferred with each other on strategy and tactics
prior to the negotiations, not only for winning representation at the
table, but on what positions to advocate once there. Once each was a
member of his country's delegation, this communication and similar
discussions with the GLU Board and others had to be restricted.
This confidentiality mandate wasn't taken lightly by any of the
observers. Would the GLU representatives feel compelled to confer if
either the U.S. or Canadian side tried to weaken the argument? Would
the required confidentiality contradict one of GLU's fundamental
principles that the interests of the Great Lakes basin supersede narrow
national interests? The issue was brought before the GLU Board for
debate, and the Board voted unanimously that the observers should
strictly adhere to the confidentiality requirements1 o Ultimately, the
confidentiality requirement was more troubling philosophically than
practically. The technical staffs of the U.S. and Canadian delegations
worked together so closely that by the time the separate American and
Canadian caucuses met to set their national positions on October 9,
1987, the two nations had combined their separate proposals and
prepared a unified draft for consideration.
Formal caucuses to finalize the national positions were held by the
separate U.S. and Canadian delegations which included each
delegation's NGO observers. While the government positions were
drafted primarily by the EPA and Environment Canada, NGOs played
a role in the drafting process. For example, even before being granted
observer status, GLU representatives in Canada and the U.S.
participated in various meetings with the environmental agency staff
during the preparation phase of each country's draft positions. As a
result of their participation, the NGOs were thoroughly versed in the
proposed amendments and their rationales at the start of the formal
caucuses. The U.S. and Canadian career diplomats played the role of
referees, assuring that everyone understood and followed the rules of
bilateral negotiations. A single formal negotiating session was held
150. Interview with Tim Eder, supra note 70, in Traverse City, Mich. (Sept. 28,
1991).
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between the U.S. and Canadian delegations on October 16, 1987 in
Toronto.
During the formal negotiation the NGOs were present as observers,
but did not sit at the main table as full participants. However, the
NGOs were allowed full interactive participation in the 'break-out"
sessions where most of the revisions to the language of the Agreement
were made. As such, the NGO representatives were involved in
discussing every aspect of the Agreement. According to Eder, the NGO
representatives were not observers, but full participants. The State
Department officials recognized them, called on them, and listened to
them. As the meetings progressed, the NGO representatives found
themselves being turned to with increasing frequency, and few state-
ments were made where the speaker did not look to them for a nod of
approval.
The NGOs' level of technical knowledge and fluency was unmatched
by any of the other participants, with the exception of the representa-
tives of the environmental agencies. Another distinct advantage for the
NGO observers was being part of a binational organization. Their
familiarity with the proposals from both Parties and the internal politics
of each gave them a much deeper understanding of the various proposals
than the other representatives. Both Eder and Jackson felt that the
process which allowed NGOs a very active role in reviewing and
amending the agreement was the most important outcome. According
to Eder, "the fact that we had a seat at the table meant that we took
ownership of the Agreement, that we had a stake in it, and as a result
we wanted to make sure that it would be implemented."'5 1  John
Jackson wrote that "[lit was widely known that non-government
members were included in this stage of the review and renegotiation. As
a result, there was a feeling within the environmental community that
their concerns were being represented and protected during the actual
negotiations.' 51 2
In the two years following the signing of the 1987 Protocol, public
interest in the GLWQA increased immensely. Requests to the IJC's
Great Lakes office for Agreement-related information rose 162 per-
cent.10 That is but one of several continuing expressions of broad
public concern in Great Lakes issues.
151. Id.
152. Citizen Involvement, supra note 145, at 8-9.
153. John Jackson & Tim Eder, The Public's Role in Lake Management: The
Experience in the Great Lakes, in 2 GUIDELINES ON LAKE MANAGEMENT 31, 36 (M.
Hashimoto ed., 1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the case described here is unique in many ways, it is
instructive in the study of global environmental politics. A number of
intriguing lessons, developed more fully below, can be distilled: (1)
international agreements and treaties can the serve the political
agendas embraced by environmental NGOs; (2) technological complexity
provides NGOs with a niche to fill and a means to develop credibility;
(3) NGOs have the ability to represent transnational interests; (4) NGO
participation in national bureaucratic forums can serve as a guide in
international forums; (5) transnational NGOs' technical expertise and
political savvy make them authoritative negotiators; (6) familiarity and
commonality of interests help to facilitate structured international
environmental problem-solving; (7) international environmental
agreements provide a basis for domestic change; (8) NGO participation
can stretch traditional negotiating formats; and (9) the profitable
interrelationship of international governmental organizations and NGOs
must be developed with caution. Below, these nine lessons are identified
and developed with discussion of how they played out in the 1987
Protocol negotiation process.
1) The first lesson demonstrated by the instant case is that
international agreements and treaties often articulate the same broad
purposes and goals embraced by NGOs. International agreements and
treaties often articulate broad purposes and general goals attractive to
environmental NGOs. Once adopted, the statements can be used to
evidence an international commitment supporting an NGO's position on
an issue. In the public domain, these agreements articulate a common
vision and approach to politics and governance; they are akin to
preambles of constitutions and declarations of independence. Their
power transcends simple questions of implementation and enforcement.
Even when they are not well implemented (perhaps, especially then),
they can be strategically embraced and adopted by NGOs to mobilize
public opinion, gain credibility, and pressure parties to adopt the
policies which NGOs support. When NGOs adopt the defense of such
agreements as a political tactic, they appear as representatives of the
public's interest in the agreement's goals.
The NGOs involved in the present case, particularly Great Lakes
United, embraced and identified with the GLWQA's goals and objectives.
They used the terms of the Agreement to push both the U.S. and
Canadian governments to adopt specific Great Lakes policies they
supported. The NGOs were aware of the scheduled review of the
Agreement and anticipated the potential issues. Of most concern was
the fact that the conservative negotiating governments might weaken
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the Agreement through political maneuvering. NGO members adopted
policy resolutions in defense of the Agreement and their leaders
advocated for the existence of a public interest in the Agreement's
future. They preempted the governments by holding their own set of
public hearings on the effectiveness of the Agreement, simultaneously
raising the political stakes and building a strong case for NGOs' formal
involvement as citizen representatives. Thus, NGOs effectively entered
political negotiations as champions of the public interest.
2) The technical complexity of many environmental issues creates
a knowledge gap into which NGO representatives can move. Technical
expertise and fluency developed by NGOs can lend credibility to their
positions and provide important leverage in negotiations. NGOs
translate the technical issues into policy options, articulating their
position, on the environmental consequences of alternative policy
choices.
The GLWQA issues were highly technical and difficult to under-
stand for almost everyone except the environmental agencies and the
NGO representatives. The environmentalists shared a common
vocabulary, and they also shared certain assumptions drawn from their
common understandings of the environmental sciences and environmen-
tal politics. Career diplomats and bureaucrats from organizations like
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget were inclined to defer to
those who were fluent in the language of environmental science and
regulation. The NGO representatives involved in this case, all highly
articulate and knowledgeable, had a perhaps disproportionate influence
in the negotiations. Their ability to translate the language of
environment into the language of politics lent the NGOs a clear
negotiating advantage.
3) By focusing on diffuse environmental issues like toxic contamina-
tion, global warming, ozone depletion, and loss of biodiversity, NGOs
have expanded the definition of stakeholder. It is commonly understood
that the resolution of these issues lies beyond the capacity of individual
governments and thus requires international responses. It is equally
true, though less appreciated, that these issues transcend not only
national boundaries, but traditional "interest" boundaries as well. The
spectrum of people with reason to participate in decision-making
necessarily broadens, and hence the argument that governments ought
to listen to a wider range of public voices is strengthened. The water
quality problems addressed by the 1987 Protocol (primarily
contamination by persistent toxic chemicals) are inherently diffuse and
pervasive in the ecosystem. The sources of toxic contamination are
multiple and widespread. At the individual level, the effects of exposure
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are subtle, but the significance of these effects may be magnified when
viewed at the global level. Like ozone depletion and global warming,
specific instances of harm are difficult to find, whereas the credible
threats are everywhere. The issue of toxics is unlike traditional water
issues where the stakeholders are limited to users, polluters, and
riparian owners. In the instant case, the sequence of events subtly
permitted NGO participation as citizen representatives rather than as
representatives of specific stakeholders. When dealing with toxic
contaminants, the stakeholder can be anyone. The traditional
conception of stakeholder, therefore, is necessarily broadened by the
nature of the pollution. These are also the considerations affecting
representation of stakeholder interests.
4) The movement toward NGO involvement in international
environmental negotiations nearly reflects the movement toward
increased public participation in bureaucratic decision-making. NGOs
that formulate strategies for their participation in international forums
can draw from the extensive experience and literature of public
participation, especially in the United States and Canada. The lessons
of this experience, however, must be considered in the context of the
North American situation and evaluated for their applicability to
international situations.
The NGOs in this case took the principled position that citizen
participation was a necessary component of any decision-making
regarding Great Lakes water quality. In their own countries, NGOs
consistently lobbied for an active role in federal, state, and provincial
decision-making. They argued that the public had a compelling interest
in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and deserved to be heard
wherever decisions about it were being made-even in formal binational
negotiations. The NGOs' call for involvement was hard to ignore given
the nations' relatively open political structures.
5) Transnational NGOs assert that environmental issues innately
transcend jurisdictional and bureaucratic boundaries. The presence of
environmental issues, therefore, compels the development of transna-
tional (as distinct from bi- or multinational) features within the
structure of the negotiations. The new transnational character,
combined with the NGOs' knowledge of governments' internal strategies
and resources, lends NGOs more power and authority in international
negotiations than they have traditionally possessed.
Indeed, although the NGO GLWQA representatives were invited
simply as "observers," they played an active role in both the preparation
of positions in the separate U.S. and Canadian caucuses, and in the
formal bilateral talks. Great Lakes United representatives had, as a
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result of the organization's binational character, certain advantages over
other, more official, participants. Their very presence, on both sides of
the negotiating table, affirmed the cross-boundary nature of the issues
and challenged the presumption of separate national interests built into
the structure of binational negotiations. As the only binational
spokespersons present, Great Lakes United's status in the negotiations
depended on the Parties' appreciation of the issues as binational. On a
more practical level, their knowledge of both sides' positions, their
familiarity with most of the negotiators, and their appreciation for the
inter- and intra-agency politics on both sides of the border, gave them
a more heightened understanding of the issues than most members of
either delegation. At the negotiating session itself, each nation's senior
diplomat followed the protocol of welcoming one another, after which the
floor was turned over to Great Lakes United for comment. Although the
government participants understood this to be "good manners and
courtesy,"154 this recognition nonetheless led to the appearance that
the NGOs were a third party of equal status in the negotiations.
6) International environmental negotiations may be carried out by
individuals who, although representing different nations, have consider-
able experience working with each other and dealing with their shared
interests. As such, personalities will often play as large (if not larger)
a role in international environmental negotiations as do the organiza-
tions and positions the individuals represent. NGOs will be more
effective if they develop common interests and personal relationships
with the range of individuals they are attempting to influence. Common
interests can be nurtured and promoted to encourage the development
of an international regime of environmental problem-solving.
An accurate picture of the "sides" in these negotiations would be far
more complex than described herein. Despite the formal structure of
bilateral talks, states, provinces, the Army Corps of Engineers, Office of
Management and Budget, Health and Welfare Canada, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Environment Ontario, NGOs, and others were
represented. The representatives of the Canadian and U.S.
Departments of State knew each other well, as did the representatives
of respective environmental agencies, the U.S. EPA and Environment
Canada. These parallel agencies shared a common understanding of the
issues as well as a common vocabulary. This commonality of interest is
not unprecedented in the Great Lakes region, however. Ron Shimizu
has pointed out that prior to the organized efforts of NGOs in the Great
Lakes, an active network of Canadian and American government and
154. Telephone Interview with Ron Shimizu, supra note 116 (Aug. 20, 1991).
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non-government scientists played a similar role to that of the NGOs in
this case.16 The scientist network, Shimizu recounts, was initiated by
the IJO and the governments during the binational water quality studies
of the 1960s and 1970s. Scientists felt an allegiance to not only their
countries, but to a scientific principle: the ecosystem approach.1" Kent
Fuller noted that the community of scientists and professionals working
on shared problems provides transboundary commonality and even
loyalty that helps the process of international environmental negotia-
tions. The NGOs differed only in that they politicized the scientific
principle and adopted, self-consciously, political strategies for imple-
menting the ecosystem approach. Commonality and loyalty were
undoubtedly effective themes for the NGOs in the 1987 Protocol
negotiations as well.
7) International agreements can lead to unforeseen domestic
consequences. For NGOs, gaining influence in international agreements
can be an effective strategy for influencing domestic environmental law
and policy. The legal standing of the agreement or treaty, and the
possibilities for influencing a domestic agenda will vary by nation.
Success, however, will increase the political stakes and attract the
organized interests of polluting industries with their substantial political
and economic clout to international environmental negotiations.
At the 1987 Protocol negotiations, representatives of industrial and
commercial interests were noticeably absent from the review and
amendment processes. This absence reflects that industry representa-
tives usually focus the resources and energy of their environmental
personnel on state and provincial regulations. They take their concerns
to the courts where decisions have an immediate financial impact.
Because the GLWQA lacked the force of domestic law, industry was not
inclined to spend time on questions of definitions, accountability, and
goals. However, industries' absence from the process may prove costly
to them. Recent laws passed in the United States refer specifically to
the GLWQA and require compliance with its provisions.1" Hence, by
the time industrial lobbyists are fending off new and costly regulation,
they will find their opponents' cases are strengthened by the weight of
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Interview with Kent Fuller, supra note 23, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 19,
1991).
158. See, e.g., The Great Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
596, § 1, 104 Stat. 3000 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. 1990)).
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international commitments. In the Great Lakes region, this has proven
to be a very effective legal strategy.
8) As the influence of international environmental agreements
grows stronger, more interests will demand access to and participation
in their negotiation. The formal mechanisms of international
negotiations have a limited capacity to accommodate varied interests
and their representatives. As a result, new forms of intergovernmental,
transnational, and nongovernmental processes will be invented. NGOs
should give consideration to proposals for new forums for public
participation in international politics.
In the future, particularly if the GLWQA appears to be driving
Great Lakes policies at the state and provincial regulatory level, it is
likely that GLWQA negotiations will receive more attention. Other
interest groups, like industry or associations of local governments, may
demand representation. The Parties will have difficulty limiting
representatives. Increased numbers, particularly of interests which do
not share in the ecological assumptions underlying the Agreement, may
make the negotiating process unwieldy. The Parties may reasonably
ask, "If we invite GLU, why not others? Where do we draw the line?"
Hence, some new format, such as the "round table discussions" frequent-
ly held in Canada, or other public participation mechanisms, may be
adopted instead of officially inviting NGOs to participate.
9) Lastly, the relationship between NGOs and international
governmental organizations (IGOs) is complex and full of hazards. IGOs
gain their legitimacy and authority from governments and must work
with governments to accomplish their ends. Conversely, NGOs often
work outside government channels, frequently in opposition to national
governments. However, in global environmental politics, NGOs and
IGOs have a strong mutual interest in creating effective mechanisms for
international decision-making. The ideology of volunteerism is
appealing to NGOs. They would argue that nation-states are unable to
act effectively in international environmental arenas, and, therefore, the
task of environmental management belongs to the independent sector
and voluntary organizations. In developing strategies for participation
in world environmental politics, NGOs should develop a clearer under-
standing of where their interests mesh with IGOs' interests and consider
those areas when dealing with governments and corporate sectors.
One unintended but predictable result of the 1987 Protocol was a
pronounced withdrawal by the national governments from the Interna-
tional Joint Commission. In preparing for the negotiations, the NGOs
appeared to give very little, if any, consideration to the role of the IJC
as an independent international organization whose mandate was to
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monitor progress in achieving the Agreement's ends. In general, the
approach taken by NGOs toward the IJC was one of lobbying and politi-
calization of the IJC's role. The NGOs frequently pushed the IJC to
take strong adversarial positions vis-a-vis the governments, while the
IJC often looked to the NGOs to raise difficult political issues the IJC
could not. The NGOs were used to create a constituency with political
clout in order to help implement IJC recommendations. Both the NGO
and the IJC viewed each other as natural allies. Neither side, however,
gave much consideration to how their mandates and objectives might be
juxtaposed at times. The NGOs' lack of consideration of the IJC's role
may ultimately lead to a weakening of the IJC's stature as an effective
international organization. This could be a dangerous concession to
conservative politicians and bureaucrats eager to reign in the IJC as an
authoritative voice for environmental protection and regulation. Caution
should be exercised by NGOs so as not to jeopardize their profitable
relationships with IGOs.
In sum, one thing is certain. The international politics brought
about by ecosystem concerns are here to stay. However we interpret
their meanings, or imagine their outcomes, they will remain interesting
and likely to affect our lives in profound ways.

